That's basically the premise of Curtiss-Wright. It rejects the idea that the federal government requires an affirmative grant of power to exercise sovereign powers abroad, because those powers "would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality." The Constitution might impose a certain allocation internally about how that power is exercised, but it doesn't really purport to limit the scope of those powers in any significant way.
Regards C-W, your quoted passage states specifically "unless in respect of our own citizens". Which is to say that U.S. law, under C-W, can specifically govern the actions of the US and/or its citizens.
The recent record also seems clouded. There have been individuals whose extradition to the US has been sought (or secured) for actions occurring principally or totally outside the U.S. The case of Manuel Noriega comes to mind:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Noriega#Criminal_prosecu...
"In April 1992 a trial was held in Miami, Florida, at the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in which Noriega was tried and convicted on eight counts of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering."
There's also Executive Order 12333 2.11:
"No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/execut...
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/04/us.assassination.policy/in...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12333
Further, your use of C-W doesn't support your previous statement: "[The Constitution] does not limit what the United States can do abroad". It simply states that there do exist powers which, even if not explicitly listed in the Constitution, would exist. Not that the Constitution could not specify, define, and/or limit such powers.
Which in fact it does -- the United States cannot engage willy-nilly in international agreements with other nations, or engage in acts of war. Both of these require specific actions of affirmation vested in the Legislature: Declaration of War by the full Congress, treaty approval by the Senate.
International law is both a fairly novel and fluid concept, and as with product guarantees, grants of legitimacy or otherwise vary greatly in there effects. Much of the UN's power lies in the Secretary General's authority to give a stern talking to of those chuffing the General Assembly, subject to approval by the Security Council or veto by any of the Permanent Members.
There are numerous countries which have acted either in opposition to UN measures, or which have succeeded in blocking actions to sanction them within the UN.
There are also other international legal arbiters though their authority is not universally recognized, e.g., the International Court, or more complex arrangements under various international criminal law constructions.
All are routinely flouted.
A country could allow for itself no military or violent action -- I imagine that the hypothetical Constitution of the Jainist State might do just that. In which case the country would, by its own laws, have no legal right to offensive or defensive action causing harm.
I'm finding dragonwriter's arguments far more persuasive here.