The offsetting argument for insurance is that it provides risk management against unaffordable, catastrophic expenditures -- it is a trade-off of a certain expenses, against the risk of a much larger uncertain expense, with an expected net cost in financial terms, but that it is rational in some cases given the decreasing marginal utility of net income (which, conversely, means that there is an increasing marginal cost of high expenses.)
Of course, the trade-off in the lottery is you are paying a certain, low cost for a chance at unlikely larger payoff -- this has not only a negative expected financial value, but -- given the declining marginal utility of income -- an even larger expected negative utility in most cases, considering utility of money on its own.
Of course, it may be rational if the utility provided to a particular player by "playing the lottery" (the entertainment value, etc.) exceeds the expected net disutility associated with financial expectations.
Utility is just a construct for describing people's preferences; to turn around and demand that people's preferences ought change to match some textbook model of utility is to put the cart before the horse.
People can reasonably have all kinds of different personal preferences, right? If your theory doesn't account for that, that may not be an example of muddled thinking on your subjects' part; it could just as well be a problem with your theory. I mean, what is actually factually misinformed about preferring the risk profile afforded by a lottery ticket to the alternative?
What's much more likely is that they're getting some entertainment out of playing the lottery, or they're poor calculators of risk and reward.
A person might well prefer the risk profile resulting from occasionally playing the lottery (small chance of tremendous gain, large chance of minor loss) to both the risk profile resulting from never playing the lottery (guarantee of no gain or loss) and the risk profile resulting from betting their entire life savings on Powerball (large chance of catastrophic loss, small chance of tremendous gain); these are all different risk profiles, so they can all perfectly well be valued arbitrarily differently.
[And I do mean arbitrarily differently. What rule of rationality demands that anyone who might want to play the lottery from time to time for the risk profile it produces ought further prefer to bet their entire life savings on the lottery? Whoever claims that to be a rule of rationality, I say they're the irrational one.]
Whether you would describe someone with such preferences as having "increasing utility of money" or not is up to you. But I see nothing problematic in having and acting on such preferences.
I don't really know to many people who think this?
Skipping some small attempts at loopholes for insurance ($300,000 of medical might return infinite benefit to oneself), yes it's stupid. Most intelligent people know this.
Your argument goes all the way, want to spend 'all' your money on gambling (or insurance), more power to them? People can do as they wish, but I'm not big on perpetuating bad memes.
The opposing argument is pretty simple, by not creating a false happiness through gambling people might create real happiness.
By not waiting on that big win, people might work towards their happiness. IE save for that big trip and get something of long term value imagination could never give.
The same is true of insurance, yet few people consider the purchase of insurance to be intrinsically irrational by the same argument.
People are free to have whatever preferences they want. Some people prefer a life with a slim possibility of a tremendous windfall (and but a negligible loss in the more likely alternative) to a life of certain continuation with the status quo grind. More power to them.