What's much more likely is that they're getting some entertainment out of playing the lottery, or they're poor calculators of risk and reward.
A person might well prefer the risk profile resulting from occasionally playing the lottery (small chance of tremendous gain, large chance of minor loss) to both the risk profile resulting from never playing the lottery (guarantee of no gain or loss) and the risk profile resulting from betting their entire life savings on Powerball (large chance of catastrophic loss, small chance of tremendous gain); these are all different risk profiles, so they can all perfectly well be valued arbitrarily differently.
[And I do mean arbitrarily differently. What rule of rationality demands that anyone who might want to play the lottery from time to time for the risk profile it produces ought further prefer to bet their entire life savings on the lottery? Whoever claims that to be a rule of rationality, I say they're the irrational one.]
Whether you would describe someone with such preferences as having "increasing utility of money" or not is up to you. But I see nothing problematic in having and acting on such preferences.
Utility is just a construct for describing people's preferences; to turn around and demand that people's preferences ought change to match some textbook model of utility is to put the cart before the horse.
People can reasonably have all kinds of different personal preferences, right? If your theory doesn't account for that, that may not be an example of muddled thinking on your subjects' part; it could just as well be a problem with your theory. I mean, what is actually factually misinformed about preferring the risk profile afforded by a lottery ticket to the alternative?