Re:Making PGP Key Management Invisible So Johnny Can Encrypt
by dredmorbius on Friday February 06, 2015 @04:54PM
(#9011813)
Interesting, but misplaced effort.
The biggest problem in widespread adoption of PGP/GPG is client support.
Case in point. I've been looking into sizes of various online communities, and decided to look for any hard statistics on the actual traffic levels of Usenet back in the day. So I looked up the old admins. One of those is Eugene "Spaff" Spafford. Also known as something of a security expert -- he wrote the book on it: Practical Unix and Internet Security (PUIS). I've a copy on my shelf.
There's a limit to how many keys keyservers will return, but 10-20 seems a generally safe bet.
Wrote my brief email using mutt (which was designed as a reference case for MIME-encoded PGP email), and awaited a response.
I no longer use PGP. Please send me readable text.
Yes, from Spaff.
So I sent him the unencrypted text, he found my Usenet questions interesting. But I was curious about his lack of use of encryption.
He responded (and gave me permission to quote him):
I don’t have a convenient PGP implementation for my Mac. I used
to use the commercial version, but it requires Java and that’s a
huge risk. GPG implementations require lots of software I don’t
entirely trust, plus there is no nice interface to my email.
So yeah. The guy who wrote the book on Unix and Internet security, stymied by lack of a decent client.
Until mainstream vendors are integrating this, we're going to be stuck.
There are other issues.
If I've got multiple devices, I may well wish to use different keys on them. Which means I've got a key-management issue of having people use the right key(s) on messages. There's the problem of key loss (you lose access to everything encrypted with it). There's the challenge of inputting long passphrases on Mobile devices (I'd far prefer a OTP / keyfob type solution or other form of semi-physical security, plus a shorter passphrase). There's device-based backdoors and other exploits. Etc., etc.
I've used PGP/GPG for nearly two decades. It remains something of a pain to deal with....
The biggest problem in widespread adoption of PGP/GPG is client support.
Case in point. I've been looking into sizes of various online communities, and decided to look for any hard statistics on the actual traffic levels of Usenet back in the day. So I looked up the old admins. One of those is Eugene "Spaff" Spafford. Also known as something of a security expert -- he wrote the book on it: Practical Unix and Internet Security (PUIS). I've a copy on my shelf.
He's at Purdue these days, and his homepage there (http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/) lists a PGP key (http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/pers/pgp.html). So I grabbed that, and ran a fetch of the signatures for the key. If you want, you can speed that with a bit of shell magick:
There's a limit to how many keys keyservers will return, but 10-20 seems a generally safe bet.Wrote my brief email using mutt (which was designed as a reference case for MIME-encoded PGP email), and awaited a response.
Yes, from Spaff.So I sent him the unencrypted text, he found my Usenet questions interesting. But I was curious about his lack of use of encryption.
He responded (and gave me permission to quote him):
So yeah. The guy who wrote the book on Unix and Internet security, stymied by lack of a decent client.Until mainstream vendors are integrating this, we're going to be stuck.
There are other issues.
If I've got multiple devices, I may well wish to use different keys on them. Which means I've got a key-management issue of having people use the right key(s) on messages. There's the problem of key loss (you lose access to everything encrypted with it). There's the challenge of inputting long passphrases on Mobile devices (I'd far prefer a OTP / keyfob type solution or other form of semi-physical security, plus a shorter passphrase). There's device-based backdoors and other exploits. Etc., etc.
I've used PGP/GPG for nearly two decades. It remains something of a pain to deal with....