key distribution is the easiest thing about PGP
The problem is if you look at the key server and find there are two keys - one legitimate, one posted by an adversary (who has read access to the recipient's e-mail) - both have a few signatures, but the signatories are several degrees away from you in the web of trust.More than a dozen different people have now sent me encrypted mail that I couldn't read because they selected the fake key on the keyservers instead of my real key.
That makes me think that the web of trust model isn't working out very well under active attack -- at least, over a dozen people failed to actually use the web of trust to avoid falling victim to this attack.
There are also seven keys for Erinn Clark (who signs Tor Browser Bundle releases for the Tor Project) on the keyservers; if I remember correctly, three are real and four are fake.
Back in 2013 I downloaded bitcoind and spent like an hour just trying to figure out if it was legit or not.
That being said, this is perilously close to the "No True Scotsman" fallacy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seth_Schoen
His hopelessly out-of-date homepage: http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/
That said, yes, PGP has a notable failing in that there's no reliable method for repudiating a key, particularly one generated by a hostile party.
If you've hung on to your key revocation certificate you can revoke a key you have generated. But that's only a small part of the battle.
I normally check signatures when downloading a new key, particularly as a way of distinguishing between multiple keys available on a keyserver. But I don't have a way to force other people who are writing to me to do that, and apparently at least the Enigmail users often don't.
Edit: Erinn is a more cautious PGP user than I am (with an extraordinarily important key!), but I expect she also has no way of forcing people to check that they have the right key when e-mailing her.
* personal e-mail .signature
* personal home page
* work employee page
* business card
I don't have my key or fingerprint on my
* work e-mail .signature
Despite this, 12 people accepted the fake key as genuine.
I'm kicking around ways of making email more reliable, one option that occurs to me is key negotiation at transmit time, or as part of the delivery process. That is: a user's home mailserver would be key-aware. Though that too is subject to skulduggery.
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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----The point of Web of Trust is to only trust keys that other people you know have also signed. Everything else is garbage until proven otherwise.
Key servers are untrustworthy because anyone can upload random shit to them.
Trying to shift WoT to a third party is trying to get something for free that doesn't emphasize solving the problem: getting everyone you know signing keys of only other people they know.
https://www.kernel.org/signature.html#kernel-org-web-of-trus...
> We couldn’t make cross origin requests to HKP
> servers from the web version of our app.
It's not entirely clear if the REST proxy for hkp they've created is open source -- if not it's almost useless as far as I can see. If I were to trust my secret key to the browser/a browser "app", I'd have to download the app from a web-server I trust and control (ie: my own server). And I'd certainly not want to load anything from any other server. I might trust a sanitizing REST proxy under my control to go and get gpg-keys.Either way, while Trust-on-first-use is certainly pragmatic -- if that's all you're going to do, then there's nothing wrong with most email clients that have gpg-support -- most will do that gladly! One might argue that in addition to downloading keys, they should be signed as "marginally trusted" on first use (or maybe there should be another trust-level in gpg/pgp: "TOFU" -- to avoid anyone else mistakenly trusting the key).
I think semi-structured "CAs" for gpg would be a much better solution: allow banks/post offices/DMV to sign and upload a gpg-key -- demanding that such keys had an attached photo, and that the institution verified the ID/name at the time of signing (with the same level of trust that is usually demanded by institution that make valid IDs: a valid passport etc).
If I could go to the bank, and get a copy of their key, and sign that (and have them sign mine) -- and so have a good pathway to "everyone's" key -- that'd be great. And unlike with browser CAs - I could chose who to trust to delegate IDs. As I've mentioned elsewhere I think cacert.org should also sign GPG-keys (just as a convenience -- you could of course sign your gpg-key with your CA-cert -- but that would require manual intervention to verify the chain of trust, unlike a signature by a trusted gpg-key).
As for the "Snowden" use-case -- TOFU is fine. Someone sends you signed and encrypted data, you can assume you're talking to whoever has the key. Maybe you can't be sure it's not the FBI/CIA/NSA/GCHQ setting you up -- but does it really matter? You've already started a dialogue, and that's probably enough to put you away for life...
The biggest adoption problem around key management that I see is getting people to generate them securely, then integrating the keys across multiple devices and multiple clients. Maybe this whiteout mail app thing is supposed to be the part of this that makes key management "invisible", but I don't see why they can't use the existing key distribution infrastructure.