Re:Evil Maid goes after TrueCrypt
by idlewords on Friday October 16, 2009 @06:49AM
(#885132)
What is of interest here is the small window of time required. You pretty much have to be in constant possession of your laptop (or a USB key that you religiously use to verify your boot record) in order to have any confidence that it has not been compromised.
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The reality is, nobody is going to physically attack your laptop (just don't bring your work machine to Black Hat). But there is an unacceptably high probability that your laptop will get stolen; for instance, you will often leave it in your car, where anyone with a cinderblock can get it in under a minute.
TrueCrypt is about the guy with the cinderblock, not about stopping Joanna Rutkowska from installing a keylogger.
Cinderblock is so unwieldy! I'm more of a broken spark plug man:
With the current implementation of this hack, you pretty much have to steal the machine once the passcode is sniffed out anyway.
For almost any given scenario to protect a system (even the one you mentioned), there's still likely to be a way to circumvent it if you can surreptitiously tinker with the machine for 30 minutes. This is a minuscule subset of the general rule: There is no such thing as perfect security.
That is the premise you should start with IMO; which is why this is not interesting. Absolutely you need to avoid releasing physical control of your machine.
Just keep it in a lock case. This solves the problem of Evil Maids, but not of Evil Maids-financed-by-the-NSA-with-lockpickers. I have to imagine that if those types of people were after your encrypted info,you'd know and you'd probably keep it handcuffed to your wrist.
I usually just keep my data on a USB key and then buy a brand new laptop from a random store every time I want to access it.
Re:Evil Maid goes after TrueCrypt
by vincent_vega on Sunday October 18, 2009 @03:01AM
(#888105)
Oh rly?
please, think of james bond! how could he drink a martini gracefully when a suitcase is chained to his hand?