But given that that both some HTTP/2-supporting browssers and much of the server-side software supporting HTTP/2 is open source, and given that all the logic will be implemented and the only change will be allowing it on unencrypted TCP connection, it'll probably be fairly straightforward to anyone who cares much to put the proof of concept of the value of unencrypted HTTP/2 together.
OTOH, the main gain of HTTP/2 seems to be on secure connections, so I'm not sure why one would want unencrypted HTTP/2 over unencrypted HTTP/1.1, and given that no browser seems to have short-term plans to stop supporting HTTP/1.1, there's probably no real use case.
But the protocol supports unencrypted use just fine.
Google didn't want something that would break even a tiny percentage of existing installs.
What is the basis of this claim? ISTR that SPDY and the first drafts of HTTP/2 were TLS-only, and that some later drafts had provisions which either required or recommended TLS on public connections but supported unencrypted TCP for internal networks, but the current version seems to support TLS and unencrypted TCP equally.