In fact there's no need for this to be tied in with HTTP/2.0 at all. Alternate systems could be designed without regard to HTTP/1.x or HTTP/2.y, they just have to agree on some headers to use and when to set them.
Making these kind of changes as part of a new version of HTTP would just be bloat on an already bloated spec, it is actually a good thing that the spec writers did not touch this!
Not only that, tying cookies with HTTP/2.0 would be a layering violation! The cookie spec is a separate spec that uses HTTP headers, and the cookie spec also explicitly says that cookies can be entirely ignored by the user-agent.
Cookies allow you to specify arbitrary data, not just a session ID, so you can set preferences without having to hit a database or even running a completely static page, using javascript to read the settings.
Cookies as they are now already allow you to control persistence. You can edit or delete them however you wish.
Instead of all the servers dumping cookies on you, you send a session-id to them, for instance 127 random bits.
In front of those you send a zero bit, if you are fine with the server tracking you, and you save the random number so you send the same one every time you talk to that server. This works just like a cookie.
If you feel like you want a new session, you can pick a new number and send that instead, and the server will treat that as a new (or just different!) session.
If instead you send a one bit in front of the 127 random bits, you tell the server that once you consider this "session" over, and that you do not want them to track you.
Of course this can be abused, but not nearly as much as cookies are abused today.
But it has the very important property, that all requests get a single fixed size field to replace all the cookies we drag across the net these days.
More critique of cookies: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies
Servers which currently drop lots of individual cookies on you now, would just start dropping that data in the server-side session data. In either case they can tie your client to the same persistent information. Same for situations where javascript sets or gets cookie values - these could all be achieved via ajax, storing server-side against your session id.
If anything, it possibly reduces my options as a client, in situations where a site previously dropped lots of cookies on me, as now my only options are to completely close my session, or persist all data, when before there were situations where I could maintain, say, my logged in user session, while removing the "is_a_jerk=true" cookie.
That could also just by achieved by disallowing third party cookies though - feels on the cusp of being a browser implementation problem (just stop allowing third party cookies).
(sorry for the repost, this wasn't posted when I posted the other one)
I still have not seen a single proposal from him that is not "forget about crypto", or "let everything be tracked".
He doesn't seems to even understand how basic key exchange work, and all his arguments boil down to "I think they can break it anyway, so we should stop using it".
IMHO, forget about him. he has no proposal and his understanding of security and crypto is downright dangerous.
You could look at section 15 here for instance: http://phk.freebsd.dk/words/httpbis.html
With respect to key-exchange, maybe the problem is that I do understand, and therefore know that there is a difference between privacy and secrecy ?
Some places we want privacy, some places we want secrecy.
Mandating privacy everywhere makes it almost mandatory for police-states to trojan the privacy infrastructure (ie: CA's -- yes they already did), and therefore we have neither privacy nor secrecy anymore.
PS: Dangerous for who ?
PPS": Google "Operation Orchestra" if you don't undstand the previous question.
So the question isn't whether children have privacy, but against whom are they able to be private, in what regard? While I'm generally ok with parents knowing where their kids are, I'm not as ok with a random creep in the neighborhood knowing.
As far as criminals and prisoners, it's far more granular than that. If I get caught shoplifting, does that suddenly mean all my medical records are up for grabs? If I am a prisoner, am I allowed to refuse to see someone who comes to visit me?
Inspecting proxies work well enough with HTTP 1.1, there's no real need to improve them, and even if we do, it should be done via a proxy mechanism, rather than via sending more things in plaintext than we have.
Anyway, HTTPS routers can (and should) terminate SSL, and in that case they can even read the Host from SNI.
But given how large datacenter consumers are considering how to build greener/smarter operations to reduce their impact (and costs) then clearly it's something to be mindful of.
Bullshit, browser vendors have always lead the way on web tech. Remember XMLHttpRequest (Microsoft)? How about Javascript or SSL, both invented by Netscape? A proper session layer is inevitable for HTTP. Websites are no longer stateless, making HTTP an ill-suited protocol. We should just accept it and move on.
I also wish there were layer between full encryption for content that is intended to be available for http and https (without the extra overhead) for signed content.
why adoption by browsers?
I suspect it would end up looking similar to IPv6: Unless ISPs are providing the majority of users with IPv6, software developers aren't well incentivized to support IPv6 in their software. Similarly to browsers, they'd lose very little for supporting the new standard now, but the gains are low while adoption by the other group is low.
I wish the article had spent more time talking about these things rather than rambling about "politics".
"HTTP/2.0 could have done away with cookies, replacing them instead with a client controlled session identifier."
That would have destroyed any hope of adoption by content providers and probably browsers.
"HTTP/2.0 will require a lot more computing power than HTTP/1.1 and thus cause increased CO2 pollution adding to climate change."
Citation? That said, I'm not considerably shocked that web standards aren't judged based on the impact of whatever computing devices may end up using them on their power grids and those power grids' use of energy sources.
"The proponents of HTTP/2.0 are also trying to use it as a lever for the "SSL anywhere" agenda, despite the fact that many HTTP applications have no need for, no desire for, or may even be legally banned from using encryption."
In the same paragraph, the author complains that HTTP/2.0 has no concern for privacy and then that they attempted to force encryption on everybody.
"There are even people who are legally barred from having privacy of communication: children, prisoners, financial traders, CIA analysts and so on."
This is so close to "think of the children" that I don't even know how to respond. The listed groups may have restrictions placed on them in certain settings that ensure their communications are monitored. But this doesn't prevent HTTP/2.0 with TLS from existing: there are a variety of other avenues by which their respective higher-ups can monitor the connections of those under their control.