DES (and by extension 3DES) isn't, per se, "insecure" at 56-bits except that technology has progressed from the mid-1970s such that an exhaustive search of the keyspace (e.g. brute force) is now practical in reasonable time. DES is resistant to differential analysis and even more modern techniques that could seriously reduce DES security are theoretical exercises at best (like those requiring terabytes of known plain-text to derive a key, or those only applicable to reduced-round implementations).
Yes, I'm aware that to a cryptographer, "theoretical attack possible" == "OMFG insecure cipher", and that attitude is a good thing. If DES was an AES candidate we'd never pick it. But from a practical standpoint, baring implementation mistakes or operational missteps, no one using known 2015 tech and technique is cracking 3DES before the heat death of the universe (or at least before we're long turned to dust).
That said, can you provide a reference to a practical (that is, not the linear cryptanalysis stuff from Davies) attack which reduces 3DES to 80-bits of effective security? If it's there, I missed it, and would invalidate what I've said.
I've always wondered this about DJB - he preaches the gospel of ease-of-implementation with Curve25519 and Salsa/Chacha20, but then for a MAC he has... Poly1305. I guess speed trumps everything?
So does Poly1305; it just so happens that most popular processors have strong hardware support. Here's an exercise: implement both GHASH and Poly1305 for MSP430.
Poly1305 isn't a walk in the park, but doesn't need special hardware support for fast constant-time implementation. Though I will agree something like HMAC is much simpler.
That said, I think it's better to avoid them anyway just to give another hit to NIST/NSA. Plus, ChaCha20 and BLAKE2 have much better performance in software than AES and SHA2/SHA3 anyway, so I would like to see those adopted as default options instead.
There is a lot of inconsistent thinking behind the advice given in the article:
- Hard-to-implement NIST curves suck, whereas GCM and Poly1305 are recommended.
- NIST apparently sucks, but NSA-designed SHA-2 is recommended.
- MACs need 256-bit tags, so UMAC and not-NSA-designed RIPEMD160 is apparently not fine, but GCM/Poly1305's 128-bit tags are recommended. On this note, 256-bit tags are pointless when the rest of the crypto infrastructure is sitting on 128-bit security.
- 3DES is not recommended because DES is 'broken', not realizing that this break is due to small key length of the original DES; 3DES is deemed to be quite secure (but slow).
- 64-bit block size is enforced, but for no good reason: SSH's 32-bit sequence number, along with counter mode, renders block size worries moot.