News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @01:09PM (#8820350)
Besides reposting the notion that timestamps imply a USB2 file dump, I am seeing only speculation in this article and no "new data on attributing".

I would like to point out that any skilled unix developer can create a script in about an hour that can make any set of files appear to have been transferred using USB2.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rudolf0 on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:13PM (#8820645)
Of course. Even more likely is that the timestamps aren't forged, but are merely a result of the attackers copying everything to some sort of local storage a few days before preparing the big dump to release to the public. It's possible that in reality the data was initially copied 3+ months ago. You can't rely on file timestamps as a sole mechanism of when the true "original" version of a file was created or modified. (This is "conclusion 2" from the post.)

This isn't really news at all, and I'm kind of surprised Schneier thought it was worthwhile enough to publish it. Look at how incredibly sensationalistic this article is, which Schneier cites as the primary source: http://www.4thmedia.org/2014/12/breaking-we-can-conclusively...

"BREAKING: We Can Conclusively Confirm North Korea Was NOT BEHIND Sony Hack", seriously?

I understand he just wanted to aggregate all the updates and commentary since his last post, but this is practically nothing and is just about bordering on FUD (I'd say "reverse-FUD" but that's not how it works, just like "reverse-racism" doesn't exist).

So far, no 3rd party has provided any strong evidence showing that North Korea either was or wasn't involved.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by netman21 on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:47PM (#8820789)
Very surprised that Schneier fell for this source. A little research would have provided this on the author, one Charles C. Johnson "The Worst Journalist on the Web" http://gawker.com/what-is-chuck-johnson-and-why-the-web-s-wo...
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rst on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:36PM (#8820737)
Faked timestamps have played a role in at least one high-profile case in the past: the forged evidence presented at the Turkish Ergenekon trials:

http://balyozdavasivegercekler.com/2012/10/04/dani-rodrik-di...

These featured files presented as dated 2003 even though internal evidence (including references to software and fonts) showed that they could only have been created much later.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by woodman on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:52PM (#8820804)
Faked timestamps are not uncommon, but I've never heard of somebody faking a transfer speed using fake timestamps. If anybody could point to a prior example, I'd certainly appreciate it. I wonder what other data can be extracted from that as well: like the file copy algorithm used for the transfer (the the files copied alphabetically, shallow, deep, etc)?
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by graylights on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @04:16PM (#8821119)
The bigger issue is that even if you accept the USB2 transfer, you can't make any real conclusions. Was the USB transfer from victim machine to external storage or from attacker machine to external storage.
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Thursday January 01, 2015 @12:57PM (#8823610)
There will be distinctly different patterns for the dates transferring in different ways. Suppose the source is a shared network drive. From share to external USB thumbdrive will have a different fingerprint than from external USB thumbdrive to single local SATA.

Also, you can likely detect what OS was used ( well Linux or Windows ) due to differences in copy order as well as speed.

In theory such analysis can be done on the Sony data and tell us something more interesting than is known so far.

I don't think there are any existing tools that analyze date stamps and determine anything quite on this level... Purely because it is rare to have such a huge such of files.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by woodman on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:20PM (#8820673)
So I've been out of security for a while, but I don't think I've ever seen this sort of misdirection applied before - or even disused.
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @02:54PM (#8820808)
I have been faking date/timestamps on files contributed to both github and pause over the past 10 years. To me that information is private and I see no reason to give real dates out for files I put into the open source world.

I messed up once and set the date/times into the future by a bit and got a bug filed against my project when someone tried to merge my software into a mainline linux distro and had problems with the future date/times.

I don't know how many people have used this information for malicious purposes, but I can guarantee that I always think about it in any hacks I've been involved in.

Do note that file creation time in unix requires kernel level access and quite a bit of low level filesystem knowledge to truly forge. The easily changeable date/time is only access and modify times. If you are going to forge this data to remove tracks from real systems you will need to root the machine completely first. It's nontrivial.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by woodman on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @03:13PM (#8820888)
Yeah the faked timestamps aren't new to me, it is the potential faking of copy speed that is interesting. To do that you would need to replicate the transfer order of the copy algorithm (cp in linux vs windows 95), and then modify each timestamp based on the prior file size in the ordered list. I've never heard of anybody doing this before.
Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @03:37PM (#8820971)
That is a very good point; in my attempts previously I simply went alphanumerically but windows at the very least does not follow that rule when copying.

I think the easiest method would be to simply generate a bunch of files, do copies, and compare the datetime stamps with the theoretical values they should have. Once you can model the discrepancies generated in real life you can fake them.

You do make a good point that it isn't really mentioned in cybercrime books that I know of, but it seems like an obvious thing. Would be a fun chunk of code to publish on github; I'll look into it.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by woodman on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @03:55PM (#8821040)
It really depends on your goals. If your goal is simply to fake the transfer speed in a tarball you leak, the easiest way would be load up a vm of the system you're spoofing - change the clock and somehow rate limit the copy. That wouldn't be nearly as fun though.

It is one of those things that appears obvious after you've been walked through it though. I've never been in a position where I needed to fake transfer speed though, so I'm not sure if I'd have thought about it. If it actually is an attempt to fake an insider attack, it is an impressive trick.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @04:45PM (#8821247)
Rate limiting is not effective. Having copied many terabytes of data do/from usb devices, I can tell you that it is not a consistent throughput. The speed of transfer depends on an inverse square of the file size of sorts. ( sensitive to the block size on both devices I'm sure )

Try copying 100gb of 2k-200k files ( all randomly sized ) It's a huge pain in the butt and works terribly on every system I've tried to do this on.

It would be way more awesome to have a utility that can after the fact forge a scenario directly into an existing tarball. Then, you can simply pick a "model to emulate" and click go, and wham you have a forged tarball.

Even if you did use a VM, it would be slower imo than a real transfer due to both the emulated system and the usb passthrough ( which is typically limited to USB 2.0 ) Show me a VM that is capable of USB 3.0 passthrough with reasonable speeds.

Unless you truly forge the dates in a carefully modeled way, it would be possible to tell that it isn't a real transfer.

Speaking of which; who steals data using USB 2.0? That's dumb. Use a modern USB 3.0 external 2.5" SSD. If you must use something small, use a cheapo 256gb USB 3.0 drive. The throughput on those is not bad. If no USB 3.0 ports are available, bring your own PCI Ex USB 3.0 card and open the system and install it. The BIOS may have intrusion detection... so be aware...

It is much more likely than direct system transfer that data is leaked slowly through an un-monitored network channel ( DNS tunneling... email... etc ) Hence the need to make things appear to be local; to distract from looking for the real method of transfer.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by woodman on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @05:22PM (#8821371)
When you get to the point where you are emulating the actual hardware in the spoof (seek time, etc), I think you've already fallen below the noise floor. It would be like a side channel attack on string comparison during hash checks, you would need a huge number of trials to tease out the signal. I wouldn't think it would be that difficult to fake a media speed constraint though - just pay attention to the clock and sleep when you're ahead of the target bitrate. You don't care if the speed is under, you just don't want it any higher than the max theoretical limit.

USB 3.0 shouldn't be a problem for VMs, just grant the guest PCI passthrough access to the USB controller. So you'd have to use something like Xen instead of Virtualbox.

My workstation doesn't have USB 3.0, so if I were to steal company data - it would be at USB 2.0 speed. Also, if I were already inside - I'd much rather do that than trying to be clever about getting it out over the network (which would be much slower and more likely to be logged).

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by graylights on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @04:08PM (#8821086)
"Do note that file creation time in unix requires kernel level access and quite a bit of low level filesystem knowledge to truly forge."

Timestamps are a mess on unix. POSIX doesn't support creation time but instead has ctime (change time). Newer filesystems add crtime but common utilities don't ever display crtime. Also partitions sometimes are mounted to not update atime for performance reasons.

crtime (and ctime) can be modified with root privileges without kernel access with debugfs.

Or you can go the ugly hackish way: date -s $forgedate && touch tmp && date -s $realdate && cat original >> tmp && mv tmp original

Neither are elegant, but certainly not hard.

What's really hard to forensically cover up is the order of inodes on a filesystem. That file with forged timestamps to 2012 will still have an inode that looks much more recent.

Re:More Data on Attributing the Sony Attack by rilita on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @04:35PM (#8821205)
It is the inode trail that I am referring to; not the simple forging of the dates ( which you could obviously do by just changing the date and duplicating the file as you've described ). Messing with the inodes is much more difficult.