$ curl -s https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/plain/src/or/config.c | grep -Eo "([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}:" config.c | sed 's/://'
128.31.0.39
86.59.21.38
194.109.206.212
82.94.251.203
131.188.40.189
193.23.244.244
208.83.223.34
171.25.193.9
154.35.32.5
199.254.238.52
I get the same country list as you: $ cat ips | xargs -I% curl -s http://ipinfo.io/%/country | paste - ips | sort
AT 86.59.21.38
DE 131.188.40.189
DE 193.23.244.244
NL 194.109.206.212
NL 82.94.251.203
SE 171.25.193.9
US 128.31.0.39
US 154.35.32.5
US 199.254.238.52
US 208.83.223.34
And here are the organizations they're associated with: $ cat ips | xargs -I% curl -s http://ipinfo.io/%/org | paste ips -
128.31.0.39 AS3 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
86.59.21.38 AS8437 Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH
194.109.206.212 AS3265 XS4ALL Internet BV
82.94.251.203 AS3265 XS4ALL Internet BV
131.188.40.189 AS680 Verein zur Foerderung eines Deutschen Forschungsnetzes e.V.
193.23.244.244 AS50472 Chaos Computer Club e.V.
208.83.223.34 AS40475 Applied Operations, LLC
171.25.193.9 AS198093 Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
154.35.32.5 AS14987 Rethem Hosting LLC
199.254.238.52 AS16652 Riseup NetworksFor what it's worth, XS4ALL has a tremendous reputation when it comes to privacy in The Netherlands, being one of the first ISPs in NL, founded by true hackers. They were the first (and only one?) that started disclosing how many subpoenas they were receiving from the government, have fought a lot against blocking TPB in court, etc -- I'm not surprised at all they are the ones hosting the Tor servers (I am a customer, and am allowed to run an Exit node, and they are very supportive when they receive abuse complaints, their entire customer support staff knows about Tor). I would be surprised if they would easily cave to a government order / seizure of their servers.
I do however have my doubts about KPN...
On the other hand, XS4ALL is always looking for the boundaries of privacy and free speech -- if there is no more (legal) room left, and as such have reached the boundary, I have no doubt they would comply. But they probably make a big stunt out of it again, using it as a marketing opportunity, which KPN, of course, will have no problems with. As long as they comply with the law.
Counterintuitively sometimes the best protection is to operate under another agency. That makes moving against Tor a battle of internal politics rather than a legal battle.
'The government' rarely has uniform views on something as complex as Tor.
Stop.
$ traceroute 128.31.0.39
...
15 mitnet.trantor.csail.mit.edu (18.4.7.65) 40.218 ms 40.661 ms 40.900 ms
16 asperta.helicon.csail.mit.edu (128.30.0.246) 45.345 ms 47.082 ms *
17 belegost.csail.mit.edu (128.31.0.39) 44.074 ms !X 45.023 ms !X 45.549 ms !XI Don't want to believe, if I can trust a Tor Network passing through that gate in MIT
You can see the list of trusted directory authorities in Tor's src/or/config.c:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/config.c#n...
There are nine of them (actually ten, but one is just for bridges), so you'd have to disrupt at least five of them to prevent them forming a majority vote on consensus together. Looks like the countries that own the IP address allocations for each dirauth are:
Austria, Germany, Germany, Holland, Holland, Sweden, US, US, US
If the above is all correct, a US<->Germany collaboration - to pick the largest set from two countries - would be one way to cause a large problem.