I don't care what you call it; the point is, it doesn't save you from anything that the correct SSH configuration doesn't already protect you from.

If you really believe that OpenSSH is too scary to expose to the Internet for fear of memory corruption flaws, don't stop at a half-measure like "port authentication". After all: once you "authenticate" the port, the attacker can simply hijack your TCP connection to trigger the flaw.

Instead, write a plugboard proxy, and have it apply a static-keyed AES-CTR transform to the data.

I think this is silly, but if you're trying to protect yourself from OpenSSH bugs, at least do something that actually protects you from OpenSSH bugs.

I personally don't use Single Packet Authentication, for exactly the reasons you cite here, but I can understand some of the motivations. The use case that feels convincing to people that do use it, from what I've been able to understand, is that it does protect them somewhat from misconfiguring OpenSSH. If you fuck up and leave password auth enabled and a password set, and you fuck up and don't have monitoring on failed authentication and something like fail2ban or denyhosts, then fwknop is yet another thing that you'd have to fuck up before you're wide open to the brute-force crawlers. One solution to this is "just don't fuck up", but I can understand people having different levels of paranoia about this. Sure, it also protects you from bugs in OpenSSH, but misconfiguration is WAY more likely for your average OpenSSH installation.

Yes, an AES-CTR transformation would be more secure than any port knocking variety such as SPA, at the cost of being more complicated. But the point in port knocking is not its intrinsic security, which is not worth to talk about: its point is actually the obscurity it adds to some other secure access method such as SSH, and its ease of implementation and usage. With it you get much shorter and less noisy logs to monitor, and it's almost for free. In a way, it can be compared to camouflage: its dirt cheap and quite effective at avoiding hits. Bulletproof vests or armoring are still required, but the question is why would you NOT be camouflaged when you can?

You're not thinking the threat model through. If you're not concerned about the kinds of serious, dedicated attackers who have OpenSSH zero-day, you're fine leaving properly-configured OpenSSH exposed. If you are concerned about those attackers, port knocking is barely a speed bump.

I also dispute that a plugboard proxy is "more complicated" than "cryptographic port knocking".

I agree with what you say regarding the APT scenario, port knocking is mostly useless there. It wouldn't be an effective camouflage in that case, and one probably has bigger problems than a hypothetical OpenSSH zero-day then.

I'm not aware of any available plugboard proxy solution, so it would have the added complication of hacking it together. That's what I meant. And there are diminishing returns there: a non-criptographic port knocking scheme with a few packets could be good enough as a camouflage in many cases. But I still find it to be a time saver in the more general case (not APT). I think having cleaner logs is worth using this simple trick then.

> If you are concerned about those attackers, port knocking is barely a speed bump.

is this because you expect this class of attackers to be able to thwart port knocking more or less trivially ?