Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by iancarroll on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @07:41PM
(#8627461)
> imposed by the CA/Browser Forum require (I think!)
That's something imposed by the audit criteria (WebTrust/ETSI). What you detailed is also why roots are left disconnected from the internet - if you compromise an intermediary, that can be blacklisted as opposed to the entire root.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by hdra on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @07:31PM
(#8627408)
I'm curious. Whats the biggest cost in running a CA? As in, what makes those certs so expensive?
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by JakeSc on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @07:45PM
(#8627479)
Ensuring physical security of CA private keys is expensive. This requires things like sturdy padlocks, closed-circuit security cameras, and up-to-date hardware and software.
These are the things you pay for when you buy a certificate from a CA. In fact, I would be 100% opposed to obtaining my website's cert from a CA if it were free-of-charge, because I know good physical security is expensive. However, I already trust the EFF and the Umich researchers (and their assurances of physical security), so I'm absolutely happy with obtaining a free certificate from them.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by mike_hearn on Wednesday November 19, 2014 @05:25AM
(#8629198)
.... also, you need multiple people in the organisation, you typically need to write your own infrastructure for vending certs, billing, you need to run OSCP responders and perhaps CRLs so clients can check if the cert was revoked, that can take a lot of bandwidth, then you need support staff because when people are paying, they expect support, etc.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by iancarroll on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @07:39PM
(#8627447)
Your mileage may vary, but the biggest upfront cost is the WebTrust audit. Certly got quoted $150k for a reasonable root and its subordinates. This is a yearly cost. HSMs are not cheap either, plus you have to host them securely, hire validation staff, etc...
There aren't a whole lot of privacy concerns with CA's as long as you use OCSP stapling, so users browsers aren't hitting up the CA each time they visit a website (Chrome never does this but other browsers can do).
Re: CA compromise. One reason running a CA costs money is that the root store policies imposed by the CA/Browser Forum require (I think!) the usage of a hardware security module which holds the signing keys. This means a compromised CA could issue a bunch of certs for as long as the compromise is active, but in theory it should be hard or impossible to steal the key. Once the hackers are booted out of the CA's network, it goes back to being secure. Of course quite some damage can be done during this time, and that's what things like Certificate Transparency are meant to mediate - they let everyone see what CAs are doing.