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Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by Someone1234 on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @06:08PM (#8592910)
Unfortunately STARTTLS is broken beyond repair.

STARTTLS is sent via the unprotected SMTP channel. The biggest problem with this isn't the lack of encryption, but more the lack of MitM protections.

Imagine if when you wanted to connect to your bank over HTTPS you first had to send a HTTP request which asks permission to "upgrade" to HTTPS. Obviously any bad guy worth their salt is going to intercept that unprotected HTTP traffic, strip out the STARTTLS, and then leave you using the HTTP channel they can monitor or alter.

So while, yes, in this case ISPs are likely "MitM"-ing their own traffic (which by definition isn't a MitM), it still leaves you open to bad guys on your side of the connection (e.g. the insecure WiFi problem). But even if ISPs weren't someone else could be.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by spindritf on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @06:13PM (#8592942)
Imagine if when you wanted to connect to your bank over HTTPS you first had to send a HTTP request which asks permission to "upgrade" to HTTPS.

This actually happens a lot. Most people most of the time don't painstakingly type in h-t-t-p-s-:-/-/... but rather just the domain name and the server on the other end returns a (plaintext) redirect to https. Which is why sslstrip works so well.

Sure, we have bookmarks, HSTS, tell people to look for a lock icon in the address bar but it's far from being a solved problem.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by iancarroll on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @07:12PM (#8593159)
HSTS preloads fixes this problem on modern browsers. Google literally has a site where you can add your site to Chrome's list (which Mozilla clones) in a few weeks.

If you're using other browsers, the problem still exists but a large majority is covered by this.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by dublinben on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @07:28PM (#8593233)
There's only 500 sites on that list. None of the largest banks in the US are even included. This problem is hardly solved.
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by iancarroll on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @07:37PM (#8593264)
(There are a lot more in Canary/Beta)

Banks have the ability to do it, so I wouldn't exactly pin it on a new solution being needed. If they won't adopt pinning or HSTS, then why would they adopt anything else?

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by tracker1 on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @01:51AM (#8594317)
Hell, banks are some of the biggest offenders of requiring SSL3, with no TLS option...
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by xnull on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @07:14PM (#8593170)
STARTTLS was never intended to thwart MITM however. We need to keep that in mind. It allows a way to start a secure channel that is backwards compatible under the assumption that an attacker can eavesdrop but not manipulate the contents of the channel. In this regard it is some measure of an improvement.

For the record I do not think it is a final solution (what is). I do often have mixed feelings about 'the perfect being the enemy of the good'. With STARTTLS my feelings aren't as mixed. A measurable improvement to passive surveillance for minimal changes and no new infrastructure. Swell.

Again, not going to condone it as a panacea - but it's never advertised itself as one.

Let's keep using it until there's something better. And let's get furious at ISPs that strip it (or modify our traffic in any significant way).

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by cm2187 on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @02:49AM (#8594431)
But TLS is too often advocated as a replacement for SSL. It just isn't. It is something else, less secure.
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by Ded7xSEoPKYNsDd on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @06:11AM (#8594888)
TLS is just a new name for SSL from version 3.1 onwards. It's much more secure then those older SSL versions.

STARTTLS, a protocol used to negotiate SSL/TLS in some plain text protocols, is problematic if it isn't enforced. Some software stupidly abbreviates STARTTLS to TLS in the GUI, which is a source of constant confusion.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by icebraining on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @03:54AM (#8594568)
How is TLS less secure? Accepting unsecured connections is a problem of the client, not the protocol.
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by wolf550e on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @03:53AM (#8594564)
using STARTTLS is not a good replacement for using a connection that is secure from the start, but TLS _is_ a replacement for SSL.
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @09:33AM (#8595534)
STARTTLS is perfectly fine.

STARTTLS is simply a method for establishing a TLS connection through the same TCP port as the backward compatible connections that don't use TLS. It's the job of TLS to provide authentication, and thus to protect from MiTM--it would be braindead to have a second authentication layer beneath it to "protect STARTTLS against MitM". If you establish a "direct" TLS connection, the TCP beneath also doesn't protect against MitM, obviously.

That some clients will accept both TLS and non-TLS connections is completely orthogonal to STARTTLS, and has its roots in backward compatibility. Good clients should provide a way for the user to enforce TLS, though.

And yes, as others have pointed out, HTTP(S) does actually work exactly that way: Unless the user asks the browser to enforce TLS (by typing https://), the browser will connect without TLS, and if the server prefers TLS, it will redirect, subject to the same MitM as opportunistic STARTTLS.

Also, I think it's kinda confused to think of your customer's traffic as your own. How does that work? Are telecom companies also allowed to listen to "their own" calls that customers make, and the post office to read "their own" letters that customers have written? Also, you have considered that your ISP's ISP then presumably also could consider all your traffic their own? So, there essentially wouldn't be anyone left who couldn't claim the traffic to be their own, so MitMs wouldn't be possible simply by definition?

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by schoen on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @07:27PM (#8593223)
We are working on a workaround for this:

https://github.com/EFForg/starttls-everywhere

I'm not sure one could say that this makes STARTTLS non-broken, but it will help mitigate the MITM risk.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by cm2187 on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @02:55AM (#8594442)
The thing is that STARTTLS is only one of two things that need to be fixed. Until DNSSEC is used, no smtp client/server is certain that it is delivering an email to who it is supposed to deliver it to and mitm attacks against its clients remain trivial to an ISP (I can't believe we even got there...).
Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by mike-cardwell on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @04:29AM (#8594632)
Enable DNSSEC on your resolver, install Postfix, and turn DANE on in Postfix. Then when you email me @grepular.com, today, your connection to me is guaranteed to be encrypted, and guaranteed to be encrypted with a certificate matching the fingerprint that I've published in my signed DNS.

Exim will soon also be getting DANE support. Not sure if it is being worked on by other mail server teams or providers.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by gcr on Sunday November 16, 2014 @11:21AM (#8614553)
DNSSEC creates many more problems than it solves. See http://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.08.10/slides.pdf for an (incomplete) overview of several issues.

In brief,

- DNSSEC enables and facilitates reflected DoS attacks by amplifying attackers' bandwidth;

- Using DNSSEC allows anyone to enumerate any of the zones of your subdomain, effectively turning on public DNS transfers for anyone who asks (see the paper for attacks against NSEC and NSEC3);

- Most importantly, no common resolver validates or enforces the validity of DNSSEC records. Chromium closed the pull request as WontFix: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=50874 and Mozilla have no current plans to implement it: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=672600

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by mike-cardwell on Monday November 17, 2014 @05:07PM (#8620981)
- DNSSEC enables and facilitates reflected DoS attacks by amplifying attackers' bandwidth;

That's a problem today, without DNSSEC, and requires fixing regardless, whether or not DNSSEC becomes wide-spread.

- Using DNSSEC allows anyone to enumerate any of the zones of your subdomain, effectively turning on public DNS transfers for anyone who asks (see the paper for attacks against NSEC and NSEC3);

I thought NSEC3 fixed that, but I wouldn't be surprised if there were attacks against it. I don't think that's an insurmountable problem.

- Most importantly, no common resolver validates or enforces the validity of DNSSEC records. Chromium closed the pull request as WontFix: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=50874 and Mozilla have no current plans to implement it: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=672600

Chicken and egg. shrug There's no reason an OS can't come with such a resolver built in. Personally I take the 60 seconds or so required to do an "apt-get install unbound" to get this functionality whenever I build a system.

Re:ISPs Removing Their Customers' Email Encryption by Buge on Tuesday November 11, 2014 @09:47PM (#8593743)
>ISPs are likely "MitM"-ing their own traffic (which by definition isn't a MitM)

What's the definition of a MitM? If you're trying to talk to Google, and your ISP is modifying what you say, I would consider that a MitM. Wikipedia mentions a router MitMing its users. I don't see how that can be considered a MitM but not this.