In what sense? In the sense of not mathematically fixing the problem, or in the sense of leaving it feasible to exploit in reality?
The problem is that the law of large numbers is on the attacker's side. If the attacker gets N tries his statistical power goes as sqrt(N), which means that to stay safe the variance in your random delay has to be large enough to cover that. That is, if d is the timing difference between the slow path and the fast path and the attacker gets N tries, the variance in your random delay has to be on the order of d sqrt(N). This is huge even for modest values of N.
I'd argue they're both as bad as one another. Since GC is non-deterministic it means you just need more cycles for an accurate result (and plus you're already having to ignore other sources of latency, like network, disk IO, OS lock contention, etc).
Timing attacks are generally a coding problems, both a JIT-ed managed codebase and a native block of code can contain them.