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Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by thaidn on Monday September 28, 2009 @11:05PM (#849716)
The final padding is never parsed if we put set them as (part of) the value of an unknown key, i.e., setting a=pi_key....<pading>
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by dfranke on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @01:27AM (#849861)
I'm talking about exploitation of this vulnerability in general, not the specific case of Flickr. Not everything is a sequence of key-value pairs formatted in UTF-8.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by tptacek on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @12:38PM (#850688)
Most of the crypto you're going to run across as a pentester will be in apps written in Java and C#, and in almost every one of those cases, garbage characters won't break a parse. ".split()" works just fine even if you have 16 characters of random high ASCII. It's one of those things C programmers definitely have to unlearn.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by dfranke on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @01:35PM (#850868)
Eeeeeeewwwww.

If you're using .split() to "parse" untrusted input, and not even validating it against a regex first, that's an epic fail in its own right.

Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by tptacek on Wednesday September 30, 2009 @04:00PM (#853511)
What a weird thing to say. You trust a regex engine more than you trust "split()"?
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by dfranke on Wednesday September 30, 2009 @04:07PM (#853526)
I trust a generated parser more than a hand-written one. Any parsing algorithm that involves the use of split() is almost certain to be weakly thought-out and have ill-defined behavior for unexpected input. A well-written parser will never read past the first unexpected character, or at least token.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl... by juli on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @02:20AM (#849925)
Attacker controls the length of the message so he can make the padding be only 9 bytes long