Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by dfranke on Monday September 28, 2009 @06:36PM
(#849389)
Isn't "game-over flaw" a bit overstated? It's a serious blunder, but if the data you're authenticating is highly structured then in many cases it won't be exploitable because the final padding from the original message becomes part of the body of the extended message, as unparseable gibberish.
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Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by thaidn on Monday September 28, 2009 @11:05PM
(#849716)
The final padding is never parsed if we put set them as (part of) the value of an unknown key, i.e., setting a=pi_key....<pading>
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by dfranke on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @01:27AM
(#849861)
I'm talking about exploitation of this vulnerability in general, not the specific case of Flickr. Not everything is a sequence of key-value pairs formatted in UTF-8.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by tptacek on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @12:38PM
(#850688)
Most of the crypto you're going to run across as a pentester will be in apps written in Java and C#, and in almost every one of those cases, garbage characters won't break a parse. ".split()" works just fine even if you have 16 characters of random high ASCII. It's one of those things C programmers definitely have to unlearn.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by dfranke on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @01:35PM
(#850868)
Eeeeeeewwwww.
If you're using .split() to "parse" untrusted input, and not even validating it against a regex first, that's an epic fail in its own right.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by tptacek on Wednesday September 30, 2009 @04:00PM
(#853511)
What a weird thing to say. You trust a regex engine more than you trust "split()"?
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by dfranke on Wednesday September 30, 2009 @04:07PM
(#853526)
I trust a generated parser more than a hand-written one. Any parsing algorithm that involves the use of split() is almost certain to be weakly thought-out and have ill-defined behavior for unexpected input. A well-written parser will never read past the first unexpected character, or at least token.
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by juli on Tuesday September 29, 2009 @02:20AM
(#849925)
Attacker controls the length of the message so he can make the padding be only 9 bytes long
Re:MD5 hash extension attack breaks API authentication in Fl...
by NateLawson on Wednesday September 30, 2009 @02:32PM
(#853279)
This is equivalent to the old claim, "Since an attacker can only write a 0-byte somewhere in memory, this is a crash-only bug."