"Goldman had advised one energy company, El Paso Corp., as it sold itself to another energy company, Kinder Morgan, in which Goldman actually owned a $4 billion stake, and a Goldman banker had a big personal investment. The incident forced the Fed to ask Goldman to see its conflict of interest policy. It turned out that Goldman had no conflict of interest policy -- but when Segarra insisted on saying as much in her report, her bosses tried to get her to change her report. Under pressure, she finally agreed to change the language in her report, but she couldn't resist telling her boss that she wouldn't be changing her mind. Shortly after that encounter, she was fired.)"
Do you think it's a thoughtful policy for Goldman Sachs?
I know if I were one of the M&A parties, I would irate to find out that the supposed advisor had a personal stake that could have influenced how things shook out.
In any case, regulators are entrusted with making sure people follow the law, not some ethical code that differs from person to person.
Maybe we can start trading in ethics? /s
How can you seriously say that? It's fine to hurt people as long as they're willing to tolerate it or remain ignorant to it? Preying on ignorance isn't ethical even if it markets well.
Goldman had written materials about conflicts. Segarra claimed they weren't enough to a "policy" by her opinion. Her boss argued, it was a policy even if it was a really poor one. He didn't tell her to change the report to say they had a policy, he told her to change it to say Goldman's policy was very deficient and need to be improve a lot.
It's essentially a semantics argument, not some huge cover up.
And her boss's stance is arguably more detailed and accurate.
The fact that they refused to do this and instead bullied her into their own opinion is remarkable. If they'll do this for something so minuscule, imagine what they'll do for bigger issues.
The tapes aren't exposing that Goldman got away without a conflict of interest policy, they're exposing that the Fed is still refusing to let staff stand by their independent opinions.
Also keep in mind that at that point, he's quoting from the Beim report, which is not from the tapes. As Lewis and the episode say, that report was written by a Columbia Business School professor in 2009, at the request of the Fed.
A major issue is the regulations themselves are extraordinarily complicated and the regulatory regime is unclear. What you characterize as "deference" is more like this: the regulators don't know what regulations out of (literally) hundreds of thousands of pages' worth of regulation they can get away with enforcing or not enforcing, but for political reasons they might be called to enforce whatever regulations at whatever time, such as with the retroactive enforcing of mortgage regulations everyone was ignoring before 2007 because the political incentives were such that everyone should have access to mortgages. So regulators are incentivized--whether corrupt or not--to build soft, close relationships. (As an aside, regulators and banks are continually building sophisticated machine-learning algorithms that have access to all your financial data, as well as powerful search systems to find whatever a regulator might demand.)
Hobbes, writing in England in the 1600s, described the "silence of the law", wherein if the king's agents enforced all his laws his rule would quickly become tyrannical and lose legitimacy. Well, again, there are literally hundreds of thousands of pages of financial regulation, depending on who you ask, that can be characterized as "must follow". Enforcing them all would draw the wrath of most Republicans and moderates, because the world does need a financial system.
The regulators work softly because, honestly, they don't know what they are doing or are supposed to do. Banks try to get in bed with regulators because they don't want to end up like HSBC; people calling for their heads essentially because they were lazy about regulatory demands for an issue that ended up being politically sensitive. A large part of compliance nowadays is trying to predict what Congress cares about or might care about in the future. Regulators are glad to get the extra access. After all, when the political winds blow the right way, they have the real power. Otherwise, don't rock the boat.
There is also corruption--always, everywhere--but if I was to imagine how a "good" regulator could do his job in the way Michael Lewis demands, well, I can't imagine that ever happening.
But anyway, there are always bad people and there is always regulatory capture, but a robust system is one in which there is no excuse for bad things and good people are allowed to work honestly. My aim was to describe how financial regulation is broken even if it was full of good guys. In fact, what constitutes doing the "right thing" is hard to determine except in retrospect.
Anyway, IMO I think the issues come down to financial transactions being somewhat abstracted from 'morals'. Sure, people rarely get into finance to make the world a better place. But, it's hard to feel telling your friends to sell stock before bad news hit's is a bad idea. Toss in people chasing after a few points here and their to hit their bonus and the incentives tend to be messed up.
Many regulations seem reasonable when applied to a financial system, but seem arbitrary for any one transaction.
As cynicalkane points out, these regulations are far more complex than "don't be bad." You don't know who's got an ax to grind to enforce a regulation this year that's been lax for years before. Plus, IT is not cheap, generating all the reports vs paying a $50K fine? Just pay the fine, but now you're an evil big bank. You'll get over it.
If you'd prefer to cherry-pick, and boil Lewis's findings down to an innocuous sentence or two, then you're welcome to do so. But if you'd read his findings as a whole you can easily find much more damning material; for example, the following:
In meetings, Fed employees would defer to the Goldman people; if one of the Goldman people said something revealing or even alarming, the other Fed employees in the meeting would either ignore or downplay it. For instance, in one meeting a Goldman employee expressed the view that "once clients are wealthy enough certain consumer laws don't apply to them." After that meeting, Segarra turned to a fellow Fed regulator and said how surprised she was by that statement -- to which the regulator replied, "You didn't hear that."
Also, nothing alarming about the quote you just mentioned either. To the extent consumer laws consider sophistication of the consumer, its probably quite right. Sophisticated investors, for example, do not have many of the protections that apply to the general public.
Most likely the regulator simply didn't know what to make of what the Goldmanite had said (and might not have even been aware of the exemptions granted to accredited investors -- assuming those are applicable here). So (being in over his head) rather than confess his ignorance, he did what must have come naturally for him: he shat his (presumably male) pants, and told his co-worker to keep her trap shut.
(1) What the Goldmanite said was innocuous (and the regulator simply didn't know what to make of it -- i.e. yes, he must have not known about exemptions for accredited investors); or
(2) What the Goldmanite said was potentially quite troubling (and the regulator knew it), for reasons we don't know yet (due to the missing context).
Which it was, or even likely was, of course I cannot say. But the basic point is that the fact that the regulator tried to hush his colleague up in this situation is by itself quite troubling. Especially if it's part of a larger pattern.
(2)
Slow down in your urgent rush to minimize this release. At least read the whole article if listening to the piece is too much to ask.
The bigger issue is that being a regulator in the U.S. is a shitty job. Half the country thinks we shouldn't even have regulators, and the other half blames regulators for not understanding what they're doing out of one side of their mouth while condemning anyone with industry experience who does know out of the other side. So no surprise that the regulators are deferential to the banks. At any given time they're one presidential election away from losing what little leverage they have.
Our regulatory system is the result of a clash of cultural values. One one hand we aren't comfortable with doing away with regulation. To the contrary, we demand it. On the other hand we think of regulatory bodies as leeching off "value-creating businesses" and condemn anyone who undertakes government service. Unsurprisingly, we get regulatory bodies that try not to rock the boat.