If you are returning two different certificates for two different situations at Google.com, the least you could do is dedicate some of your vast engineering resources to making the plugins to support such a setup production ready. If Google uses it's technical sophistication to avoid the pain while the rest of the web burns then that's, at best, hypocritical.
I'll make you this deal: if you do it for Apache, we'll do it for NGINX. That's the right thing to do. As would be making SSL certs free, but that's a conversation for another day.
Apache/OpenSSL would have to assume that pre-TLSv1.2 clients support only SHA1 because there's no signature_algorithms extension, but for TLSv1.2 clients can Apache/OpenSSL choose between a RSA-SHA1 cert and a RSA-SHA256 cert?
The reason I ask is because ECDH certs seem to be even harder to come by than RSA-SHA256 certs right now.
That's certainly the plan. What did I say that suggests otherwise?
The transition that I'm talking about is the transition to SHA-256 overall. If you're in a position where your CA sold you a certificate that they shouldn't have then I feel sorry, but if you're blaming us for that then I think you're pointing in the wrong direction.
What would be the technical challenges facing offering free wildcard certs? Is it just engineering time, or is there something more fundamental? That seems like it would do much more for web security than pushing for higher minimum encryption standards on certs would...
If Microsoft's 2016/2017 deadline is reckless, what SHA-1 deprecation date would be right by your measure? Some have suggested ~2020 (5 years issuance from 2015). Would you really be happy depending on SHA-1 in 2020?
(Edit: on re-read, the 2020 suggestion sounds like a strawman - but that's actually what we were on the road towards and we may not have even managed that.)