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Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by kazinator on Monday August 18, 2014 @01:56PM (#8193676)
Is there a strong, formal version of the Doomsday argument not based on cubicles and such? The obvious flaw in that version is that it is based on finite possibilities: that is, finding oneself in this or that kind of universe out of so many possible ones.

For starters, we have no idea of how likely our universe is; we know what numerator is 1, but what goes on the denominator? Is there even such a number? If so it is something so huge that the probability is vanishingly close to zero.

Then what about the parallel universes hypotheses: what if the universe is constantly fragmenting into multiple futures. In one future, I will submit this comment and close the tab, then check my e-mail. In another, I keep the tab open and go make a coffee.

This proliferation of multiple futures from any moment would tend to provide a way for doomsdays to be circumvented.

If you are cloned into N futures in this moment, and you're killed in N-1 of them, then you don't know it; by the anthropic principle itself, only the surviving future matters; there is no consciousness in the others. The suriviving future has no idea about the size of N, either.

Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by saalweachter on Monday August 18, 2014 @02:17PM (#8193759)
The big gaping hole I see is that the blog post at least doesn't treat the earlier epochs with the same question. If a person in 1000 CE took up the same question, would they predict Doom Early or Doom Late? If everyone for the last ten thousand years would predict Doom Early, that seems like a piss poor predictor.
Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by AlexMennen on Monday August 18, 2014 @02:44PM (#8193892)
That's just a special case of a general feature of probabilistic arguments: a small but positive fraction of the times they are used, they will give wildly misleading predictions. If we assume that everyone uses the doomsday argument with a uniform improper prior on the total number of people who will ever live, then all of them will conclude with 95% probability that they are not one of the first 5% of people to ever live (that is, that no more than 20 times the past population will be created in the future), and 5% of them will be wrong, which is exactly how probabilities are supposed to work.
Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by scotty79 on Monday August 18, 2014 @02:39PM (#8193873)
It just predicts that farther future is more uncertain than closer future if you know nothing about how past influences future.
Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by lutusp on Monday August 18, 2014 @03:28PM (#8194142)
> Then what about the parallel universes hypotheses: what if the universe is constantly fragmenting into multiple futures.

Actually, that's the many-worlds hypothesis of quantum theory. Parallel universes refers to something else.

> This proliferation of multiple futures from any moment would tend to provide a way for doomsdays to be circumvented.

Not exactly circumvented. In the many-worlds picture, all outcomes occur, including the one predicted by the Doomsday argument.

> If you are cloned into N futures in this moment, and you're killed in N-1 of them, then you don't know it ...

True but not compelling, because quantum theories don't require each of the many worlds to be occupied by a conscious observer. Were this not so, the universe couldn't have evolved to the point where consciousness was first possible.

Re:A Primer on the Doomsday Argument by baddox on Monday August 18, 2014 @02:57PM (#8193984)
> The obvious flaw in that version is that it is based on finite possibilities: that is, finding oneself in this or that kind of universe out of so many possible ones.

As far as I know, that's a requirement for any thought experiment involving SSA vs. SAA.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-Sampling_Assumption

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-Indication_Assumption