Re:Show HN: Prisoner's dilemma tournament with bots that can...
by spimta on Thursday July 31, 2014 @01:36PM
(#8115639)
I actually fixed the number of rounds on purpose--I figure the Nash equilibrium in the classical iterated PD isn't very relevant in this wildly different version of the game, and I want to see what kinds of strategies emerge with fixed-size rounds.
I didn't explicitly forbid collusion, since it's tough to prevent it in practice; I would appreciate it if teams simply submitted one bot or several bots with different strategies.
Re:Show HN: Prisoner's dilemma tournament with bots that can...
by Retric on Thursday July 31, 2014 @02:27PM
(#8116007)
A perfect simulation is recursive so you need to add a resource limit. In which case a bot can either lie by detecting it's being simulated or just waste time and give out zero information.
>If the game is played exactly N times and both players know this, then it is always game theoretically optimal to defect in all rounds. The only possible Nash equilibrium is to always defect. The proof is inductive: one might as well defect on the last turn, since the opponent will not have a chance to punish the player. Therefore, both will defect on the last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent will defect on the last no matter what is done, and so on. The same applies if the game length is unknown but has a known upper limit.
Also, I'm wondering if the rules prohibit collusion. The rules say one bot per person, but don't mention teams.