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Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by higherpurpose on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @12:50PM (#8109346)
If Microsoft was serious about this, they'd also offer end-to-end encryption for their e-mails (open source protocol, otherwise they shouldn't bother).

But because they aren't doing this, it just shows they are more concerned about not losing business overseas than "fighting for your e-mail".

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by TheCraiggers on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @01:03PM (#8109449)
I'm no longer sure that is enough. Considering what happened to Lavabit, just offering end-to-end encryption is only going to work until the government decides they want what you have hidden. I doubt that Microsoft will put up as much of a fight, or take the high road out, like the Lavabit founder did.

Fighting them on the legal front to stop such practices from starting may well be the best option right now. Even though Microsoft may be doing this for business reasons, it'll still help everyone.

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by me1010 on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @01:55PM (#8109865)
End users need to and can take control over their own email privacy. GPG. Ten minutes to download, install, and generate a key pair is all you need to secure your email. Perhaps the willingness to do so will increase when the government successfully argues that non-encrypted mail posted through an email server is the same as posting your thoughts on a public peg board...

If you want full compatibility, you can pay a small yearly [extortion] fee to the Verisign gatekeepers... but I prefer not to...

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by mahyarm on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:13PM (#8109980)
Pffft, GPG doesn't work if you want to communicate with other people. It's very difficult to get people to use it, and the UX is horrible for it. On top of that it's even harder to use on mobile platforms. GPG also doesn't have forward secrecy.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by me1010 on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:35PM (#8110112)
GPG works fine. It's difficult to get people to use encryption regardless of the implementation... I used to work for an organization that required, by written policy, all email to be encrypted. Everyone had an S/MIME cert with a short pin... the number of encrypted emails I received over a 7 year period was precisely - without exaggeration - '2.' People do not care about encrypted email, and don't want to bother with even the slightest inconvenience. This is by far the largest problem with encryption, much more so than any 'it's too difficult to use' excuse.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by marcosdumay on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @03:04PM (#8110292)
Email can not have forward secrecy. You receive it in a time, and want to read it later.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by morsch on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @01:35PM (#8109735)
Lavabit wasn't end-to-end encrypted.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by Kalium on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @01:43PM (#8109791)
If memory serves, the feds had probable cause and a warrant when they want after Lavabit. Lavabit tried to fight it. Lavabit lost. So they shut down instead and tried to spin it as the feds shutting them down.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by TheCraiggers on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:11PM (#8109969)
They did indeed have a warrant for the info. The problem was how they chose to pursue obtaining the info- that is, installing a MitM black box that could read all customer email going through it, not just the citizen for whom they had the warrant. I'm not sure if they promised or not to only snoop on that one individual, but even if they did you would have no way of knowing if they're telling the truth or not. From what I read, he wasn't necessarily trying to protect Snowden, but protect the rest of his userbase.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by Kalium on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:16PM (#8110001)
What other options were there? There was only one SSL key. Once you can MitM one user in that scenario, you can MitM them all.

To my understanding Lavabit didn't have a system in place for separating out one user like that, and the feds would likely have been disinclined to wait for the development of one.

So perhaps we should take this as a lesson in designing systems to be as secure as possible even with legitimate warrants rather than as a sign of warrants being abused.

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by TheCraiggers on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:33PM (#8110105)
My understanding was that he offered them his programming services to create a method to do exactly what they wanted- pull the email info out for just one user. True, he was going to charge them for it, but it was only $2000. A laughably small sum for the people he was dealing with. Supposedly, they denied this offer because they couldn't control it. From my perspective, $2k and a couple day wait is a paltry sum to pay to not trample over the constitution.

According to Wikipedia, just one month prior, Lavabit had complied with a search order for one user suspected of child pornography. I'm not exactly sure what the difference was between these two cases, but it does show he had at least some capability to do what they asked.

I do agree that "one SSL key to rule them all" is perhaps not the best practice. That said, the design of the system doesn't matter as much to me. Reality is that the system was designed in the way it was, and when offered two methods of getting their data, the feds decided to take the wrong one. (In my opinion.)

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by Kalium on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:44PM (#8110165)
It wouldn't surprise me if the feds are sharply limited in what they can pay for warrant-wise. There's a good chance they simply didn't legally have the option of waiting and paying $2k. Understandably, the government does not want "I have a warrant" to become the sound of a cash cow begging to be milked.

If I were to guess, I would say control is actually a huge issue. If it's their equipment and software that's certified for this use, it probably satisfied chain of custody and certification requirements. If it's someone else's, who knows? It's almost certainly not certified and so it might not stand up in court at all. Certification is a big deal in the government and a court is likely to be skeptical about the use of an unproven and uncertified magic software black box in executing a warrant.

So what it comes down it is that the feds may not have actually had a choice of how they got that data.

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by TheCraiggers on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @03:00PM (#8110262)
Excellent points, which I didn't think of.

However, I'll ask you this: is it constitutionally agreeable to trample the rights of others for the sake of gathering evidence? I would say no. Just like how I would say searching all personal mail coming from a certain zip code because you know of someone sending secrets would be, in my viewpoint, wrong. I can chalk up the initial issue of a warrant to the judge not understanding technology, but as soon as it was explained in a courtroom how it was tied together, he should have told the feds to seek evidence elsewhere.

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by Kalium on Thursday July 31, 2014 @11:19AM (#8114590)
Thank you.

I think it's about collecting evidence in the least invasive way possible. To me, the priority is limiting damage while still allowing law enforcement to function. One of the key privacy advantages of how LE access to phone companies or gmail or similar is implemented that it allows them to be granted access to just the data in question and little more.

What really becomes a problem is when the evidence in question is only available from one source and there's no way to do it that doesn't run the risk of what I'm going to term information bycatch. At that point there are really only two viable options - allow the collection with bycatch or disallow the collection due to bycatch.

The first is a significant privacy risk. That said, it's also not a new one. As long as people have kept records or written letters, a search has run the risk of exposing the private information of other unrelated people. Certainly, the same concern applies to tapping phone calls, and that's permitted by courts.

The second runs the risk of hobbling law enforcement entirely. Without perfect knowledge of what a given document, packet, phone call, etc. might contain, it's impossible to say that a search will or will not invade the privacy of another person in addition to the subject.

My understanding is that a warrant is for information or items because it's known and understood that information bycatch isn't always avoidable. This is considered unfortunate but unavoidable, as there cannot always be assumed to be other and better options.

I think this goes back to my earlier point about design. If a system isn't designed to contain any breach, then any breach - legal or otherwise - will be uncontained. I think this is less a constitutional problem than it is a technology one.

Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by me1010 on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:00PM (#8109900)
I believe they were told to hand over the SSL private key. I'm not sure everyone using the Lavabit service was a criminal... So, my thought is that probable cause for handing over the master key to the hotel should be a bit more than probable cause to hand over the room key...
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by Kalium on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:08PM (#8109945)
That's my understanding as well. Unfortunately, Lavabit used one SSL certificate for every incoming user, rendering it impossible to use anything lesser. So to continue your analogy, the hotel only had one key - the master.
Re:We're Fighting the Feds Over Your Email by marcosdumay on Wednesday July 30, 2014 @02:16PM (#8109998)
End-to-end means that Microsoft has no capability of reading the emails, or share them with anybody, as they are not in any end of the communication.