There's also extensive guidance over who should not be included and when people should be removed from such lists. I can't help feeling tat most of the commenters here are stating their assumptions about the document's content without giving it even a cursory reading.
Then the watchlist can be public, those on the watchlist can be public, their reason for being on the watchlist can be public and we can decide - together- who should and should not be on a watchlist. We already do it with criminals. Why is this process any different?
We don't publish lists of suspected criminals. For many offenses requiring procedural steps prior to arrest and charge (eg presentment to a grand jury which returns an indictment), the process is not public, mainly to preserve individuals' rights.
Not really. pp. 47-49 contain examples, and prior to that, there is no specific behavior for "Reasonable Suspicion", which is probably the catchall for putting regular people on the watch list. The "Known Terrorist" and "Suspected Terrorist" sections contains specifics, but you don't have to be either of those to be put on the TSDB. You do have to have "Particularized Derogatory Information" which is specific information relating you to known terrorists or suspected terrorists. However this requirement is not expanded upon (that I can see).
The section that talks about how people should be removed from the list is short (less than a page), and basically says "we should look into it if someone complains". There is no mention of court procedures, there is a single point of contact (the DHS TRIP), and there are procedures that seem to basically amount to "look again". There is no requirement for disclosure of what put you on the list, and thus no means to effectively fight it.
I realize why you are complaining about people not doing a "cursory reading", but the fact is, a cursory reading can support as many false statements as just reading the article. It also gives a false sense of security in your beliefs. I can't be 100% sure of my statements above because I haven't read it fully, but I'm more sure of them than of your statements.
Kind of makes you wonder what value the The Intercept is adding, doesn't it?
The section that talks about how people should be removed from the list is short (less than a page), and basically says "we should look into it if someone complains". There is no mention of court procedures [...]
That's because this is administrative guidance. The executive branch isn't part of the judicial branch. Agencies don't make rules about court procedure, the judiciary does. You're conflating two completely separate branches of government.
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Let me give you a super-quick civics lesson on US government, just so we're on the same page.
The Legislative branch consists of the House & Senate, aka Congress. The main thing it does is produce Statutory Law.
The Executive branch is headed by the President and includes all the various agencies of government. Agencies which are tasked by Congress with carrying out various tasks are required to promulgate rules and establish internal procedures (such as guidance in the implementation of the rules) for their own governance. These rules and procedures make up Administrative Law.
The Judicial branch resolves controversies between other branches of government, between the states and the federal government, and so on. Court decisions can cite statutory law, administrative law (if the case involves the operations of a government agency), common law (loosely, a set of legal traditions), and precedent established by higher courts. New precedents are sometimes referred to as judicial law.
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Now, statutory law might define which matters fall within the purview of the courts, and there's a great deal of judicial law addressing how legal disputes should proceed through the courts, but I wouldn't expect to find such things discussed in an agency guidance document. Obviously I'm only describing the very tip of the legal iceberg here, but there seem to be some very basic misconceptions in this thread about how the government functions.
Because you don't have to be a Suspected Terrorist to be put in the TSDB. Which means that there are a whole host of things that aren't on those lists that can land you in the TSDB.
>You're conflating two completely separate branches of government.
No, I'm really not. "court" is not unique to the judicial branch, for example, courts-marshal are conducted within the military and not under the judicial branch.
>That's because this is administrative guidance.
Yes, which means that there should be better policies in place to keep this out of the judicial courts.
>You're conflating two completely separate branches of government. No, I'm really not. "court" is not unique to the judicial branch, for example, courts-marshal are conducted within the military and not under the judicial branch.
Well, that's bullshit. Sometimes you just have to own your mistakes, my friend.
However, in a criminal case, the accused has a sixth amendment right to know what they are charged with and to be confronted by the witnesses against them.
I don't see why this shouldn't be the case here.
The idea that you can be added to a watchlist, but you can know why, or by whom, or how to get yourself removed, because you are preserving an individuals right seems counter intuitive to what those rights should be.
Unless, I'm misunderstanding you.
There is also a huge difference between being a suspected criminal and being a suspected terrorists, by how those definitions are actively managed. Suspected criminals are not barred from boarding planes, nor are they barred from banking, or housing, or otherwise. They are simply surveilled in a different capacity, until they are no longer suspected, or a case is developed to charge them. The process does have public components to preserve the rights of the individual.
And as to my cursory reading - you are correct. I didn't see those standards as detailed. I will review them. But my point remains, why not publicize the specifics of those placed on the watchlist, just like we publicize the charges against those in criminal and civil proceedings. How is this different?
This conversation will go better if you don't start out with straw man arguments; I said no such thing.
The idea that you can be added to a watchlist, but you can know why, or by whom, or how to get yourself removed, because you are preserving an individuals right seems counter intuitive to what those rights should be.
...but not if you don't take time to actually read the document we're talking about, which includes sections on challenging inclusion and removal from lists. Absent a satisfactory administrative outcome, petitioners still have resort to the courts. This is consistent with the Constitutional design.
"The No Fly List, once distributed, clearly infringes upon a citizen's right to travel; and the Court cannot conclude based on the present record that there are no means less restrictive than an unqualified flight ban to adequately assure flight security, such as comprehensive preflight screening and searches. Second, the current record is inadequate to explain why judicial involvement before a person is placed on the No Fly List is either unnecessary or impractical, other than perhaps within the context of an emergency based on a specific, imminent threat that requires immediate action. Nor does the record conclusively establish that there cannot be any opportunity, either before or after an American citizen is placed on the No Fly List, to know of or challenge any of the information used to list him, even where such information could be summarized in a way that does not compromise sources or methods." [1]
The other posters within random comments are also conflating the watchlist with the no-fly list. I don't need to go into details about the differences, because their names say it all.
(Source: I built one of those data interchange legs, and worked a lot with the TSC)
That's not going to happen. Should someone be wrongly excluded from the list (they turn out to indeed be an evil terrorist), then the bureaucrat who excluded them will lose their job (lots of yelling, angry meetings, uncomfortable situations, guilt, etc.) They don't want to lose their job, so no one gets excluded.
People don't care what you do so long as it doesn't harm them. Sentiment is changing towards that. It's reflected in the data. Expenditure will just be greater with any the counter.
I would argue that criminals are way far and away more deadly and corrupting to society (though terrorist is just a particular form of criminality, so all criminals except terrorists).
A simplistic, but telling, example of this how many people in the US were killed by terrorists last year compared to how many were killed by criminals.
Instilling a national fear of terrorists does not reduce the amount of terrorism. It does however justify vast expenditures of manpower and resources. Further by inculcating this fear, politicians and bureaucrats now need to "cover their asses" just in case something bad happens, which further feeds the need for manpower and resources.
This is why they create a 'nomination', 'verification' and 'implementation' process with their “originators,” “nominators,” “aggregators,” “screeners,” and “encountering agencies.”
But the problem comes down to the actual facts. This document does a terrible job of separating a process design - First a candidate gets originated by an originator, who passes that said candidate on to a nominator, etc - from the basic factual requirements needed to become listed as a suspected (or actual) terrorist. (Though the latter would seem easier to determine.)
What is really needed is a clear set of factually determined checks to show that someone is indeed a suspected terrorist. Not a process design that creates a structure towards watch list inclusion.
In design this is often a problem. It's a very common mistake. Teams, Companies, Professionals design a process, but not the necessary, required steps - and everything just gets lost in that process, especially when everything takes place according to the plan.
Here's what the watch list needs. A list that triggers inclusion.
If a appears to have done x, y or z, a get's "originated." If x, y, and z are verified, a gets nominated. At this point counter rationales for x, y and z must be presented to excuse the suggestion of terrorism when there is none. Etc.
What is important are the verifiable X, Y and Z actions. That's what a document of this type should present.
Now I know that the response is that if people are told how they get onto a watchlist, they will try to avoid those tasks while maintaining their terrorist agenda, thereby avoiding being categorized as a suspect.
But isn't that the point, don't we want people to not engage in pre-terrorist activity, like going to a training camp in Afghanistan, or sending money to organizations who have actively taken responsibility for civilian bombings. Isn't that the point?
Getting people to be classified as suspected terrorists is not what a watchlist should be about. A watchlist should be about commonly agreed upon actions that as a society we do not support, and we can change our minds about what we do and do not support over time.
Then the watchlist can be public, those on the watchlist can be public, their reason for being on the watchlist can be public and we can decide - together- who should and should not be on a watchlist.
We already do it with criminals. Why is this process any different?
Criminals can be just as deadly and corrupting to our society, but yet we've figured out a way (to some degree) to deal with them. We should be able to do the same with Terrorists.
A new process is possible, one that will in fact make us, and everyone safer. This method is not that process. Or at least that is my opinion.