Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by X-Istence on Thursday July 17, 2014 @08:59PM
(#8051145)
Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom use the same PRNG...
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Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by shawnz on Thursday July 17, 2014 @09:19PM
(#8051195)
But /dev/random has the additional constraint that it will stop outputting if that PRNG hasn't been reseeded in [some reasonable amount of time/output bits]. So you are guaranteed to get bits that have come from a recently-seeded PRNG, rather than any old PRNG. I have had this argument on here before and the conclusion was that it's not a real issue, but I think this is what the parent poster is talking about.
EDIT: Thanks for the clarification tptacek. I don't mean to disagree -- in fact it was you who explained this to me last time as well.
Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by tptacek on Thursday July 17, 2014 @09:23PM
(#8051206)
"Recently" seeded isn't a meaningful distinction. It has either been "seeded" or it hasn't. The recency of the seed --- a point Linux's interface worries a great deal about --- has nothing to do with security.
Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by hueving on Friday July 18, 2014 @12:05AM
(#8051609)
>The recency of the seed --- a point Linux's interface worries a great deal about --- has nothing to do with security.
Unless you are concerned about where the seed came from (e.g. not storage like /var/run/random-seed) or have any concerns that there is a flaw in the PRNG that could leak information.