Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by X-Istence on Thursday July 17, 2014 @08:59PM
(#8051145)
Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom use the same PRNG...
Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by shawnz on Thursday July 17, 2014 @09:19PM
(#8051195)
But /dev/random has the additional constraint that it will stop outputting if that PRNG hasn't been reseeded in [some reasonable amount of time/output bits]. So you are guaranteed to get bits that have come from a recently-seeded PRNG, rather than any old PRNG. I have had this argument on here before and the conclusion was that it's not a real issue, but I think this is what the parent poster is talking about.
EDIT: Thanks for the clarification tptacek. I don't mean to disagree -- in fact it was you who explained this to me last time as well.
Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by tptacek on Thursday July 17, 2014 @09:23PM
(#8051206)
"Recently" seeded isn't a meaningful distinction. It has either been "seeded" or it hasn't. The recency of the seed --- a point Linux's interface worries a great deal about --- has nothing to do with security.
Re:The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSS...
by hueving on Friday July 18, 2014 @12:05AM
(#8051609)
>The recency of the seed --- a point Linux's interface worries a great deal about --- has nothing to do with security.
Unless you are concerned about where the seed came from (e.g. not storage like /var/run/random-seed) or have any concerns that there is a flaw in the PRNG that could leak information.
If the seed value for urandom were compromised or you were unsure of its provenance (some systems carry over from last boot), would you not be safer calling /dev/random for something sensitive like key generation? What if you did not trust the PRNG that urandom used?