Credit card thieves in Comcast vs in TOR. Given the number of employees who has remote access to customers routers (ie support), sysadmins that has remote server access, and personale who has physical access to switching equipment, whats the risk that one of those people has a criminal record? This will always be non-zero, and one can never actually test it.
In TOR, this risk can be tested[1]. Exit note can be probed by sending unique credit card numbers or other profitable personal information, and then observed by seeing what the node owner does. If they act on the information, the node then get blocked. You can not do this with Comcast since your identity is known to the personal of Comcast.
The NSA threat, as talked about, is reduced by using TOR. Doing statistical analysis is in theory possible but in practice very hard. Out of all the Snowden leaks, not a single one present this as a ongoing work happening. Non-tor traffic analysis is however presented as business-as-usual and should be assumed to happen at every point in the network.
Last, the HTTPS Everywhere you mention is a direct answer to the SSLstrip for the most commonly used websites. Claiming it is implemented backwards because it uses a blacklist is a bit unfair, since blacklist and whitelist each has their own tradeoff in security. HTTPS Everywhere has no false positive and protect against the common threat, but will be vulnerable against uncommon ones. If they had gone with a HTTPS-only approach, it would have caused a extreme amount of false-positives, and users would have turned it off. This trade-off (security vs false positives) is commonly the distinction between user products and server products.
KB SSL Enforcer do not protect against sslstrip and MITM[2] for new installations. If the Tor Browser Bundle included KB SSL Enforcer, it would worsen the security of the Bundle compared to HTTPS Everywhere, and would be counter to the design. Rather than leaving no records of the sites you go to, KB SSL Enforcer have to record and permanent store it.
[1] http://www.slideshare.net/FreeLeaks/exposing-malicious-tor-e...
The NSA threat relies on the assumption that they are targeting you specifically; the risk with a rogue exit node is that you are exposing yourself to an adversary that doesn't care who their victim - i.e. most criminals. My issue with Tor advocacy is that it's attempting to mitigate the risk of a perceived adversary by exposing users to a much more realistic threat. My spouse and I have both had our credit cards stolen before, but I've never had any reason to believe that I've been targeted by the NSA.
There is a definite tradeoff with regards to the whitelist/blacklist model, but ultimately both solutions are really just patching over inherent flaws in SSL trust model. I wasn't clear in earlier post - my issue is not necessarily with the HTTPS Everywhere model, but rather the perception that it gives the user pervasive end-to-end encryption and solves the issue of rogue exit nodes.
With a tor exit-node, the operator can't identify who is sending them the traffic. They can't distinguish a investigating police from a victim.
You can disagree and think that rouge Comcast employees are easier identified than Tor operator. This is a trust question, and everyone is free to pick who they trust and who they don't. The argument given in favor of Comcast just don't sway me, and it would likely require a research paper with test data in order to actually prove what has higher risk associated with it.
The NSA do not target people specifically. That was proven by the revelations from Snowden, and has been quite obvious for quite a long time. NSA doesn't care who their victim is when they are collecting the information. It is cheaper and more effective to target everyone, and then data mine the result after everything is in their hands.
If you want to see nodes that are blocked, http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/ looks to be a good site. There has also been several research projects which has explored different avenues for finding bad nodes, and the TOR Project created a few years ago a python project which incorporated most those methods to automatically scan for malicious nodes (https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README).
And what if they did sslstrip your connection to your bank's website? Would Tor catch it if the exit node only did it for a week or two and only to .5% of the connections? Would any of the victims be able to determine the source of the attack? How many people on Tor actually keep track of what exit nodes their traffic is going through?
How many people keep track of the route their packets take? (Dare I say none?) How many third parties will it pass thru? (Many). How many of them can trusted to not monitor you (this is why ssl and even ssh was invented), how many have adequate security controls to prevent data theft (again this also why ssl and other tools were invented), how many can be trusted to not forward your data to a hostile government, etc.
It's the same problem, trust. And since when was the internet considered a trusted network? Calling out Tor for inherent trust issues with the path is ironic, neither the internet nor tor is a trusted network. Tors solving a different problem: monitoring. Both have the same problem which neither solves: tampering, but other technologies do (ssh, TLS, etc.)
In both cases, you shouldn't trust a third party (or an intruder into that third parties network) to either not modify your packets or to respect your privacy. At least tor helps with the later, the former isn't solved by blindly trusting an ISP or assuming your entire route is trusted (NSA anyone?).
Trust no untrusted network. At least tor is Upfront about this.
If you're going to pay for something over Tor, it should probably be with a prepaid credit card (or bitcoin). And if you're buying something anonymously then you know you're taking a risk.
Same as with email accounts or any other account. It doesn't make sense to use any account through Tor that you've used outside it, as it could already be identifying information.
This isn't always possible for Comcast customers.
I don't trust Tor for a completely different reason: you become a threat. Just by sending Tor traffic from your home, you're flagged as a potential active monitoring target, and I don't really need the additional heat.
No! When using Tor, you are not trusting any single node, and that's the whole point. The exit node does not know your IP or anything else about you, and the other nodes do not know what server you're communicating with. And you should never send any personal information over Tor, such as your credit card, because the end server would be able to identify you and steal that information (and why would you trust the end server? The idea is not to trust anyone when using Tor.)
The simple answer is most people that use an electronic device -- Tor or otherwise -- have no idea what they are doing. Because Tor is advertised as extremely safe, they think they are safe. Anyone wanting an interesting stream of data just has to operate as many exit nodes as their budget can handle.
When you use TOR you should be aware of the trade offs.
The golden rule is don't trust something you don't understand, even if you do, don't trust.
Those that support HTTPS: news.ycombinator.com; twitter.com; www.torproject.org
Those that don't: cryptome.org (!); zzaper.co.uk (the Vim tips article from a few days ago); forbes.com; vimeo.com; nytimes.com
End-to-end encryption would be great, but the internet at large just isn't there yet in terms of both HTTPS support on most sites and safeguards against SSL tampering.
Using tor do add an additional anonymity layer.
There is anyway no guarantee at all, that non-TOR traffic doesn't cross borders. And you can't assume that any three letter agency acts within the (intended) legal boundaries. To be safe, only end-to-end encryption helps.
Also, we can assume that the NSA operates within those bounds because that's what Snowden's leaked documents say in describing their systems. We have their internal documentation as proof.
I think most Tor users don't have an adequate understanding of the threat model. It doesn't help that the Tor Project has at times upsold the anonymity provided to a ludicrous extent[1] (to be fair, they do address the risk in their FAQ[2]). Is it more likely that that Comcast will MITM me, or some random exit node? I might expect Comcast to maybe inject an ad into an HTTP connection or do some DNS redirect to shoot me an advertisement, but I don't worry about them stealing my credit card or injecting a buffer overflow or something. In fact, they have a profit incentive to not do so. I don't have that guarantee with a random exit node. It might be a generous privacy advocate, or it might be someone who has more nefarious profit incentive in mind[3]. If you're only connecting through Tor just to avoid the NSA, then you have to assume that both a) the NSA is targeting you to begin with, and b) that exit node you're going through isn't controlled by the NSA (or GCHQ/FSB/PLA/etc).
sslstrip[4] undermines the prospect of protecting yourself by connecting solely over SSL through Tor. Even then, in my experience more than half of the sites I visit don't support SSL to begin with. The HTTPS Everywhere plugin that EFF provides and is included in the Tor Browser Bundle is implemented backwards - it connects over SSL only when the site matches a whitelist[5] (I use KB SSL Enforcer on Chrome myself).
Sorry if this came off as a rant - I just see too many articles like this that prop up Tor as a silver bullet without discussing the risks and establishing an adequate threat model that allows the user to make an informed decision regarding the risks/benefits of using Tor.
[1] http://betaboston.com/news/2014/05/07/as-domestic-abuse-goes...
[2] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRo...
[3] http://threatpost.com/small-number-of-malicious-tor-exit-rel...
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibF36Yyeehw
[5] https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere/faq