There is a striking parallel in the futures markets: Their original role was to help farmers hedge their risk of bad harvests by setting a fixed price for future delivery of foodstuffs. That market overtly and explicitly requires that there be hedgers and speculators, otherwise - no trade. Dark pools are no different, for the reasons you nicely outline above.
You could argue that what Barclays really should have done was channel some retail flow into LX, but sources of that kind of unlimited, innocent liquidity get snapped up pretty quickly.
[1] http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-20/levine-on-w...
You can't ask for much more than an intelligent former insider with excellent writing skills who wants to explain financial news to others. He makes other journalists look as uninformed as they are.
Not quite they were also to allow downstream businesses to fix their inventory costs, that would be the hedgers that you allude to. That is the original purpose of a futures market to allow both the suppliers and consumers to hedge risk.
Initially futures markets were restricted to individuals and businesses that dealt in the product covered by the futures contract, but over the years 'speculators': actors who at no point want to accept a delivery of the product managed to get themselves into the system. Speculators are simply middlemen between the actual producers and actual consumers of the futures product. They do not add value to the system, literally the last thing in the world they want to happen is to actually have two containers of pork bellies turn up at their door step.
Futures markets work absolutely fine without speculators as their is intrinsic value in a futures market for both producers and consumers without a revolving cavalcade of middlemen getting in the way of settling contracts.
There has also been quite a bit of academic research on the effect of speculation in futures markets, and by and large the conclusion seems to be that they help, rather than hurt these markets and rises in commodity prices have been driven mostly by external factors [1].
[1] http://www.forbes.com/2011/05/24/oil-speculators-are-your-fr...
"The upshot is that futures markets–and the speculation that occurs therein–provide a public service. Regulating, restricting, or eliminating those markets would not bring prices down or make them more predictable."
TL;DR Coal futures trader accidentally takes delivery of coal barges at his harbor district office building.
To add to this: another issue with retail flow is price and volume. Only a few really big players out there have enough of this flow to make it interesting to institutional traders.
*Although per footnote six it looks like at least some trading along those lines is possible and Liquidnet is in that business.
The complexity that exists in this small corner of the active financial markets defies simple explanation even by some of the most articulate translators of this sort of stuff (I'm talking about Michael Lewis, who wrote Flash Boys, which reads like an advertisement for IEX, one of the "dark pools" talked about here who has to let in HFTs to make markets). This level of complexity exists across all corners of the market, whether you're talking about derivatives contracts, shorts, HFTs, or any other niche.
Working in this field is not like doing your taxes, where you can hire a professional accountant, and they'll reliably produce a close-to-optimal output given clearly stated IRS rules. It is also not like doing physics or math within bounded contexts with repeatable, testable, and measurable outputs. The closest thing I can think of to doing business in high finance is building a scalable, adaptable model of a human brain - one that can predict what you'll say or think before you do so. Anyone who presumes to know how the market moves, or promises to hedge against all risk, is just blowing smoke.
If you're not ready to "read the fine print" in this industry, you're just putting yourself at risk.
I think that the issue at hand is that being effective does not make it ethical.
'Now, to be clear: While it's just a complaint, and Barclays hasn't had a chance to respond, Schneiderman makes a pretty good case that Barclays was deceiving its big institutional customers. But this is not quite the same as making a good case that Barclays was ripping off those customers. The complaint is long on evidence of false advertising, but shorter on evidence that the "predatory trading" was actually predatory. There's a certain amount of foamy fulmination at "predatory trading," but nowhere is there any evidence suggesting that Barclays's institutional clients were actually harmed by it.'
The position that "Barclays deceived their customers, and should be punished" is also consistent with "Barclays did not materially harm their customers."
Fine, I've corrected my wording above.
The passage you quoted is exactly what seems like weird apologism to me. If I sell someone something that I'm sure is just as good as what they want and lie about it being what they actually want, I'm "deceiving" but "not predatory".
The claim seems dubious.
They later thanked me for the IE upgrade and said how impressed they were at how much less malware their machine had on it.
Or: Providing somebody with what they need but selling it as if it's the thing they think they want can absolutely be deceptive and non-predatory, and the difference is important.
Consider also the way many technical decisions often have to be marketed to non-technical clients.
So to my mind, to care about the difference is sound thinking, not apologism, and I feel like you're emotionally matching 'argument that doesn't condemn a thing I want to see condemned' to 'apologism' rather than thinking it through; I'm guilty of that too on plenty of occasions.
Note that none of the above should be considered to be an opinion on whether Barclays were also predatory (I don't honestly know) or whether their behaviour was morally bankrupt (my answer to this would be longer than the existing comment, inconclusive, and unsatisfying both to right and to read :)
A "dark pool" is simply a trading exchange where orders aren't published (trades, of course, are). Huge investment banks run dark pools as a service for clients. The premise behind a dark pool is that institutional buy-side investors would use them instead of a lit exchange because they want to trade against other buy-side investors, without market-makers and aggressive, automated sell-side firms to skim off their profits. Barclays LX is a dark pool set up by Lehman.
It turns out that the idea that big buy-side investors can trade with each other without middlemen in a dark pool is probably a fiction. The premise probably doesn't hold. There are at least two big reasons for this:
1. Giant institutional investors tend to take similar positions. If one giant firm is gobbling up FCOJ, the others probably want to trade in the same direction. So when you restrict your trading partners to similarly structured and sized firms, you tend not to have counterparties to take the opposing sides of trades.
2. The timing of decisionmaking at giant firms is slow, and there aren't all that many of them relative to the market as a whole. So even if there are counterparties to match for trades, that match probably doesn't happen within the window of time that the traders actually want to trade (you want to move a block of stock in minutes or hours, but if you can only trade with other giant mutual funds, it might take days to find a match; think about the difference between filling a market order on ETrade versus trying to sell your house).
So for Barclays to make LX actually do something, rather than just acting like a frustratingly inert list of big firms, they needed to get sell-side firms to trade there too. Which they did.
The subtext of the Bloomberg post is that getting the sell-side into the LX dark pool was probably a necessity, because when you look at the revenue numbers, Barclays was making its real money from the buy-side; the HFT traders paid it a pittance compared to the mutual funds. All things being equal, it was economically irrational for Barclays to court HFT firms. Of course, in reality it was entirely rational, because without the automated traders, no trades would have happened at all.