The mobile device is the one most people have the least control over in terms of software (which can be both good and bad) but is also the one they are most likely to lose in a shady part of town.
I agree with the rest of your post though.
if we're talking defending from suits; your phone is probably turned on a lot larger percentage of the time than your laptop so it's more susceptible to a cold boot attack
if we're talking defending from some thug who jacked your phone; it probably doesnt matter
If a key has multiple subkeys, are they all used in encrypting a given message?
That's an aspect of PGP/GPG use I'm not clear on despite >15 years use of it.
Really? That's not how I treat my security at all. My phone seems to clearly be the least secure computer I own. Admittedly I run all linux on my non-phone computers, but I'm not totally sure I'd agree with you even if I ran Windows or OSX.
Am I that wrong?
This is orders of magnitude safer than a full-disk-encrypted laptop because people hardly ever shut down their laptops, so keys remain in memory. There is also the possibility of cold-boot attacks, and of course the (retrospectively) insane design wherein any program you run can access all of your data.
iOS applications are always code-signed in a way that is tied to a real person or corporation, thoroughly sandboxed, and subject to review, making malware essentially non-existent. If discovered, it can be yanked at any time. What few remote exploits there have been were national news - and quickly resolved.
iMessage is end-to-end encrypted 100% of the time using a keybag - each device on your iCloud account has its own private key that never leaves the device. You get notified when a key is added to the keybag. This is really incredible, because without even knowing it, huge swaths of the population are using properly end-to-end encrypted messaging just by owning iPhones.
iOS is a tight ship and its attack surface is minuscule compared to that of a commodity computer.
I didn't know about keybag, that's very interesting.
If I remember correctly an encrypted iphone (4 I guess?) was the most secure, but with a bit of hackery one could use the device itself to bruteforce the pin (and thus access the key, and then the data). Not sure if that's actually been patched in later iterations of the iphone.
If you find this stuff interesting, consider going to passwords^14 (August 5th-6th, Las Vegas): https://passwordscon.org/
Personally, I have my key on my phone, and I'm fairly comfortable with it - though there are certainly some that aren't.
My understanding was that you can associate a key with your email address, does this just mean you would have two keys associated, one for "[email protected] Desktop" and one for "[email protected] Phone"?
ARGH. The whole point of PGP keyrings --- the costliest part of the PGP UX --- is that you don't have to have a single key. If you're terrified of exposing your secret key on your mobile device (which is frankly the most secure device you own), just cut a new key for it.
Any time someone suggests a new application for PGP, people come out of the woodwork saying things like "what, you want me to put my PGP key in my browser?" No. We want you to put --> a <-- PGP key there.