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Re:Provably Fair Shuffling Through Cryptography (2012) by javajosh on Thursday June 12, 2014 @09:53PM (#7887090)
TL;DR: No - actually, there is no way to protect a player from a bad actor casino.

The server always knows the state of the deck! Hashing, cutting, etc doesn't matter. In that game of high card, the computer can win in every case but one, when you pick the absolute highest card.

Further, the "fairness" of the shuffle has more to do with the ability to identify (or define) "noise", which is an extremely hard problem mainly because noise is a definition of exclusion. E.g. if a sequence can't mean anything, then we define it to be noise. But how many possible meanings can a string have? I think the technical term is lots, although there are others that involve boldfaced greek letters.

Players have to trust the casino. There is no test a player can do to "verify" a casino is being fair.

(The real attack vector a casino has to worry about is if someone can predict or retrieve the PRNG seed that you used for a particular shuffle, which would be enough for the player to infer the content of the deck - which is what the casino already knows.)

Re:Provably Fair Shuffling Through Cryptography (2012) by petrosagg on Thursday June 12, 2014 @09:56PM (#7887096)
Actually, you don't have to trust the casino. As pointed out by fryguy there are ways to ensure no party knows the deck [1].

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_poker#Shuffling_cards_us...

Re:Provably Fair Shuffling Through Cryptography (2012) by javajosh on Thursday June 12, 2014 @11:07PM (#7887271)
Wow, I've never heard of commutative encryption and this is a clever application! My claim was wrong - although the OP doesn't mention this in his article.