Looks like you can buy order requests from people who social engineered order numbers out of amazon reps via chat. A rep from amazon provided someone who didn't authenticate themselves amazon order numbers [1].
> using third-party honeypots to capture your info, using the domain registrar, or a combination of any of these.
But how does a "third-party honeypot" capture your activity on Amazon? What does a domain registrar have anything to do with placing orders on Amazon?
[1] http://www.htmlist.com/rants/two-for-one-amazon-coms-sociall...
See someone make a blog post on their site about buying an Xbox from Amazon. Get WHOIS data from registrar. Have name and address of person who purchased Xbox. Use details to request replacement
To me, a simple resolution would be to escalate the "item not received," issue to a state side department (not in India, from what I'm understanding), track recent orders and customer interaction (super simple algorithm), and lastly and MOST importantly do not allow customer orders to be given out so freely with a verification of address and name (at least require an account pin or last 4 digits for the order in question).
If Amazon implemented at least these barriers, then the security of an account would fall where it should...back on the owner...not so easily be phished through Whois data, or just knowing someone has an Amazon account.
It's almost as if a black hat could use a phone book and tie names, with addresses and phone numbers and straight phish for data. This is just way too easy for fraud that the fact that it's Amazon is appalling.
I do get this, and as an Amazon customer, I'm glad this is their stance overall, but on the other hand it seems like they could handle this situation more securely than they do. It seems to me that you could have some sane middle ground where you do no-questions asked replacements, but with some caveats like no ability to change the address the item is being sent to from the original order unless the person you are communicating with can prove they are the account owner.
Maybe have a sort of two-factor system where the CSR can mark the order as "replacement approved" but you have to login to your Amazon account and take some action (just click a confirm button or whatever) to actually send the order out. At least in that case you wouldn't get cases like mine where someone managed to pull a replacement order without (seemingly) ever having actually had access to my Amazon account.
I fail to see what the "security" issue is, other than Amazon choosing to lose some money on fraud. That's not a security issue to anyone outside of Amazon, and Amazon seems clear in their stance.
Edit: A much bigger problem is Amazon's use of OnTrac, which repeatedly fails to make deliveries. Even in downtown SF.
I doubt this is the case. I've had to place chargebacks against Amazon to get my money back for purchases that were not delivered due to Amazon screwing up and telling the vendor that the software key(s) were not purchased.
For anything software related, they offer no refunds even when they and/or their vendor screw up to the point the product is unusable.
There may be a difference between how they treat physical and digital purchases then, because my experience (and the experience of vast numbers of internet commenters) is that Amazon will refund or replace a physical order with basically zero investigation.
Frequently with physical products Amazon is able to place the majority cost [they only lose out on their commission] of the refund onto the supplier. [e.g. If Amazon's fraud check fails to catch a fraudulent order, they push the cost of the chargeback onto the supplier if it is a FBA or MFN item. They also do this if their system screws up and merges multiple products onto the same ASIN even tho they are different colors or whatever.]
My guess is the vendor in this instance was large enough Amazon had to make a different deal where Amazon was the one eating the refunds if it was Amazon's error. The vendor blamed Amazon. Amazon couldn't even figure out I issued a chargeback and successfully disputed it for my money back.
I have noticed that there doesn't seem to be any category of items sold by 3rd parties with more fraud than software, although this doesn't sound like such a case.
What does Amazon do after you place a chargeback against them?
From what I can tell, Amazon failed to process the chargeback correctly on their end and the order doesn't show it was ever done on Amazon's end. I'm not really surprised.
The last email I got from them on the subject was that the software was now available like 3-4 days after the dispute ended. I didn't even bother to download it since I just got it elsewhere with the refunded $$.
However, I didn't do the chargeback until after 3 separate CSRs [including 1 from the vendor] all told me they wouldn't do a refund.
For the record, I don't understand why Amazon keeps allowing this. It seems like it could be fixed without much of a hit on customer experience, and the fraud ultimately does cost all of us more, as they have to cover those costs through higher prices.
the scammer just needed the name, email and billing address
associated with their accounts
Guess what, eBay just leaked 150 million names, emails and addresses. This will be a goldmine for scammers.http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-replacement-fraud-2014...
But that's probably a big reason to _not_ let the orders through.
I don't see why anyone cares if Amazon is liberal in replacements. So long they're not somehow hurting your account standing with Amazon, it's Amazon's choice.
My experience has been positive with Amazon and there has been situations where they've gone out of their way to make the customer happy. I'm fairly confident that a situation like yours can be resolved with Amazon over phone.
It's not Netflix you don't need to stream anything any crappy connection will do.
I find it hard to believe you're unable to check your email for weeks. Unless you don't want to but then don't complain at that time.
And believe it or not there are still people in this world that may only have an email address with their employer which they don't access regularly outside of work.
And now back to the original article:
We are only getting one of many parts of this story, for all we know the scammer perfectly told a sob story about ordering a gift for their grandson who they haven't seen in several years and will be visiting soon but it didn't arrive in time for their trip and now would like it sent directly to the grandson while they are visiting him so they can still see the joy their gift will bring him.
My point is I don't assume that Amazon isn't trying pretty hard to prevent this fraud, and I don't assume scammers aren't putting in quite a bit of work to commit it.
| Why is Amazon's security for replacement orders so lax?
Amazon values customer satisfiction above their fraud write-off.
| Why would they send a replacement to an address that has never been associated with me, and is in a wholly different state than the one the original item was sent to?
Because the time between ordering an item, and defect can be sufficiently large to cover moves: people shift around all the time. It's entirely concievable you'd like to exercise replacement rights from Texas, even though you've ordered it from NY.
| How did the scammer know about my order in the first place to social engineer the replacement request?
Via: either buying order requests, using third-party honeypots to capture your info, using the domain registrar, or a combination of any of these.
| Why haven't Amazon black-listed the 13820 NE Airport Way; Portland, Oregon address as a destination for replacements? This package drop address shows up again and again when you Google around for people who have been hit by Amazon scams.
I suspect this might be http://reship.com/ (Alexa rank: 166K). This is entirely legit: if you're a UK customer who'd like to buy stuff that are exclusively US-only, reshippers are the cheapest way to do so. Based on their Alexa rank, I suspect Amazon makes quite a money on these customer segments. Blacklisting them also wouldn't help this case: reshipping companies can easily buy up a handful of different addresses in a range of cities, making this a game of whack-a-mole.
| Can I really trust this company to hold multiple credit card numbers of mine in their database, one click away from someone potentially ordering thousands of dollars of merchandise that they can apparently easily redirect to an address that should have been black-listed years ago, if there were any kind of sane security policy in place?
Note that no credit card, or password database has been compromised in executing this attack. This is social engineering corporate goodwill at it's vilest.
I suspect the root cause of this issue to be the friction-less execution of this engineering. A proper solution for this problem might be as simple as sending out an email with clickthrough-link-confirmation before replacement shipping; this would raise the bar from "knowing about an order" to "knowing about an order, and having an active compromise on the mark's inbox".