Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort()
by ccurtsinger on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @03:01PM
(#7879790)
There is no "killer input" for randomized quicksort. I'm surprised libc doesn't select pivots randomly already.
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Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort()
by ahomescu1 on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @04:40PM
(#7880312)
Except if you know the PRNG state, but I imagine that's really hard to pull off.
Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort()
by gamegoblin on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @08:19PM
(#7881191)
I wonder of it's possible to do some statistical attacks by sending sample input and measuring response time? That is, after getting the response times for a million sorts, perhaps you can make inferences into the current PRNG state?
I suspect fluctuations in latency would make this exceedingly difficult, but I am constantly amazed by the statistical attacks people pull off.
Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort()
by gsnedders on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @10:46PM
(#7881555)
Considering the fact that timing attacks based on memcmp short circuiting were shown to be remotely practical a decade ago, latency isn't going to be an issue. The bigger question is whether you can get down your inputs to a small enough number to practically determine PRNG state (you probably can).