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Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort() by ccurtsinger on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @03:01PM (#7879790)
There is no "killer input" for randomized quicksort. I'm surprised libc doesn't select pivots randomly already.
Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort() by ahomescu1 on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @04:40PM (#7880312)
Except if you know the PRNG state, but I imagine that's really hard to pull off.
Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort() by gamegoblin on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @08:19PM (#7881191)
I wonder of it's possible to do some statistical attacks by sending sample input and measuring response time? That is, after getting the response times for a million sorts, perhaps you can make inferences into the current PRNG state?

I suspect fluctuations in latency would make this exceedingly difficult, but I am constantly amazed by the statistical attacks people pull off.

Re:Algorithmic complexity attacks and libc qsort() by gsnedders on Wednesday June 11, 2014 @10:46PM (#7881555)
Considering the fact that timing attacks based on memcmp short circuiting were shown to be remotely practical a decade ago, latency isn't going to be an issue. The bigger question is whether you can get down your inputs to a small enough number to practically determine PRNG state (you probably can).