I'm sorry that your wife had poor care - nobody should have to go through that.
But isn't the approach you've described exactly what we want to avoid in a healthcare system? Blame is almost poisonous in its ability to encourage people to cover up the truth, "misplace" documents, make excuses, and so on - this often actively hinders improvement.
Applying the principles of air accident investigation to the NHS is absolutely something I applaud, because the focus should be on why accidents happen, and how they can be prevented — not on who is responsible for them, outside of the most egregious cases of professional failure. Most medical professionals are competent and skilled, and really try rather hard to avoid causing harm to their patients. But mistakes and accidents will always happen regardless of this.
I'm actually very surprised that such a system isn't already in place in the UK. We've already got an independent body which investigates rail accidents, for example - the RAIB looks into all major irregularities or failures on the UK rail network, and rather than finding fault, identifies root causes for failures. That often includes things like the design of systems to reduce the possibility of human error, or even such things as shift patterns which risk causing sleep deprivation. They then issue recommendations for improvement to different bodies as required, and I think they have some legal clout to follow up if they're not implemented.
It seems like a system similar to that would be effective applied to the NHS, but I'm very cautious of heading down the same litigious route as the US.
Whilst the primary purpose was to help us piece together everything that had happened[1] and process that there definitely seemed to be an element of the midwife going through things taking down notes on places where things had gone wrong for later follow up.
[1] After five days of labour, including three extended trips back and forth to the hospital, it got a bit difficult to even work out on what day things happened, never mind what order they happened in.
I don't know if I believe this. I have found many medical professionals (not all of course) to be arrogant and cocky and even if you pointed directly to the cause of the problem, would most likely not think that those rules apply to them.
"not on who is responsible for them"
Mistakes happen because of people. If there isn't some sort of punishment or blame, the majority of people will just continue on with what they are doing (and the mistakes will continue to happen).
We need to blame people, so they change their behavior and have less accidents in the future. We also need to know why it happened.
"Blame is almost poisonous in its ability to encourage people to cover up the truth"
If someone covers up the truth, they should be fired immediately. I honestly don't want someone like this working anywhere near the medical field..and neither should you.
Children cover up their mistakes and lie..adults own up to their problems and admit when they made a mistake.
Also, the reason pilots have less mistakes is because a computer pretty much does 99% of the work. This is not the case with surgery and medicine. Humans still do most of the work.
You: Mistakes happen because of people
Article: When a space shuttle crashes or an oil tanker leaks, our instinct is to look for a single, “root” cause. This often leads us to the operator: the person who triggered the disaster by pulling the wrong lever or entering the wrong line of code. But the operator is at the end of a long chain of decisions, some of them taken that day, some taken long in the past, all contributing to the accident; like achievements, accidents are a team effort.
> the reason pilots have less mistakes is because a computer pretty much does 99% of the work
Except in take-off and landing, which is when most accidents happen. Also, automation would not have helped at all in the United 173 situation - that was clear human error, and the reason those kinds of errors happen less are due to the accident investigation and human resource management techniques this article is talking about:
> To the great credit of the aviation industry, it became one of the most influential disasters in history. Galvanised by it and a handful of other crashes from the same era, the industry transformed its training and safety practices, instituting a set of principles and procedures known as CRM: crew resource management.
You want everyone on your team to be focused on quality outcomes, not on avoiding blame.
When someone is made accountable and the first thing they do is establish a process to avoid blame then you need to ask the question: do these people have my best interests at heart or are they avoiding being accountable?
On many occasions the outcome is to avoid a breach rather than to fix a problem.
The decision makers and the senior staff have considerably smaller shifts. With respect to the surgical and anaesthesiologist staffing, most of them (80%+) are contracted out and are private staff working on contract to the NHS now. A surgeon for example will probably spend two days a week on NHS cases, one day being surgical and the other being consultant and that's all you see of them. The remainder of the time is lucrative private care and occasionally teaching (which is well paid as well).
There are a few exceptions to this i.e. StR's and consultants who seem to migrate into a speciality then leave after a few years. They all take the extra shifts because they're paid for the privilege of up to a 50% bonus. They're overworked because they're chasing the cash.
The REAL overworked staff are mainly the support staff i.e nursing, supply, logistics. Most of them are contracted out now as well in the larger PCTs.
Even with all that, no one should be allowed to cover their arses as it turns into a vicious circle of unaccountability. It's a poor excuse which must not be allowed to continue in the profession (or ANY profession to be honest).
Punishing people for making mistakes might motivate the lazy, but it will not fix systemic issues.
>Also, the reason pilots have less mistakes is because a computer pretty much does 99% of the work. This is not the case with surgery and medicine. Humans still do most of the work.
A number of recent high-profile crashes were blamed, in part, on pilots' manual flying skills getting rusty due to the prevalence of automation. If anything, automation is a leading cause of pilot error.
Surgery is a risky thing, no matter how 'minor' you perceive it to be.
When I did the first poat surgery BP obs run (6 hours later - nurses had skipped her in post op, doctors not seen her either!!!) and found she was 70/40 @ 149bpm with 93% o2 saturation then I assure you its juat negligence. Plus they picked the wrong surgical method and placed the ports too close together so the laparoscopy had no chance of success.
(I had another life before EE and software which was a little closer to the ground on this). I prefer to appear as ignorant as I can tell the difference between facts and fuzz.
The statistics outlined above reflect this, it includes the element labeled as 'human error' (assuming they are up-front about this, which is in a litigious society not usually the case).
A friend of mine almost had his wife bleed to death during delivery, she lost pretty much all her blood and was going out when they located a doctor capable of diagnosing the problem on the spot. He's a pretty tough guy and never at a loss for immediate solutions to whatever problems appear in life. He's never been so helpless. If not for one doctor out of a whole pile of people who happened to be there that seemed to be making things worse rather than better she'd have died. And that's 'routine childbirth' in the hospital (which they push you very much here to avoid, do it at home, so much more fun and natural)... Life is fragile, and as soon as you start cutting things or delivering babies or such then you're at risk. Routine tonsil surgery, hernias, gal bladders etc have left people with serious complications or in the morgue.
I've had more than I would like to do with the insides of hospitals in the last couple of years and I try to avoid having procedures done unless they are absolutely necessary. I don't play the lottery either...
When these processes are not followed and no effort is made to even acknowledge their existence then it is no longer within the realms of human error. It is just negligence.
This is the majority case when someone dies. They literally just left someone or skipped something or overlooked something they do every time successfully.
We expect risk but we expect reasonable mitigation strategies rather than none.
When this happens there is no excuse. None at all. Not a statistic, not a human error allocation, nothing. The same as if I can't be bothered to QA a change, roll it out and it screws up a client's financial data.
You make a change, start running tests to make sure nothing is broken. It's the end of Friday and you don't finish the testing. You close everything down and on Monday you forget you had a last few tests still to complete. You pass the change into your build process and it makes it into a release. You didn't follow the process… not because you maliciously decided to skip testing, it was simply a human mistake (slightly different to your comment, but let's be charitable and assume most people aren't purposefully breaking things).
Does tracing the problem and firing you stop it happening again? Does it even stop you from making the same kind of error again in ten years time when memory has dimmed? In the end you've lost your job and your company has lost someone who probably did good work for many years (and would no doubt continue to do so in the future) over a single easily made mistake (however big the fallout from that mistake). You're also much more likely to try and bury your mistake if you know it will cost you your job.
On the other hand what about adding a step to your build process where a second person runs the testing while they review your code? No one gets sacked, everyone learns something and the chances of this happening to anyone else are massively reduced. Is the person who made an understandable mistake any more to blame than the manager who oversees the process as a whole? They allowed flaws in the process that meant your mistake could get into a release. It’s rarely as simple as one person making a mistake.
I'm simplifying of course, if your build process is anything like ours there are multiple levels this would be caught at... which is kind of the point. In our development process there are four places this error would be caught before it made it to an official release. If our release goes wrong the worst that happens is we annoy the people using the software, yet we've built up a (reasonably) robust process in exactly the way described in the article.
It’s as the article says: When a space shuttle crashes or an oil tanker leaks, our instinct is to look for a single, “root” cause. This often leads us to the operator: the person who triggered the disaster by pulling the wrong lever or entering the wrong line of code. But the operator is at the end of a long chain of decisions, some of them taken that day, some taken long in the past, all contributing to the accident; like achievements, accidents are a team effort.
She's been through 4 years of shit getting a diagnosis to start with thanks to several GPs being disinterested or just incompetent, now a year of immobility after a fucked up surgery and now faces at least 2 years of recovery and rehabilitation.
When it's over we're rolling out the legal eagles but based on past experience I expect to have to do a few weeks of forensics first and possibly get a court order to hand medical records over. Historically we've requested them and they've either been too expensive to prepare (ha) or completely disappeared. It's like chasing cockroaches with a torch.
And this is a minor surgical issue (hernia).