https://madiba.encs.concordia.ca/~x_decarn/truecrypt-binarie...
He needed to get some older version of Visual Studio and a very specific combination of service packs and updates in order to get to matching (nearly) the entire binary.
Could it be that the devs really wanted to keep developing in XP because some part of their dev chain required it, but with support being discontinued they of course couldn't run XP and consider that computer "secure" to develop on?
Obviously, if this theory has some grain of truth to it, it can only be part of the explanation for the TrueCrypt weirdness that's been going on today.
If I had to bet on it, I would say it's most likely they got Lavabitten. But then still, the XP remark seems like a very odd choice if it's intended to function as a canary of sorts.
This seems unlikely: the screenshots in your link clearly show the source could be built on Windows 7. The trouble Xavier mentions is with the updates to VS2008 SP1, not Windows service packs.
Unless, of course, something more shadowy is going on.
That's the canary.
Not only is bitlocker backdoored, and most TrueCrypt users would know that, but they also say it is available on all windows versions, which is eminently not the case.
In this situation, warrant canaries (or maybe an NSL canary as the case might be) is a subtle indication that everything is no longer in a known-good state and something has been compromised.
Although given some of the comments by danielweber, I'm increasingly less inclined to believe this was a canary. Developers throwing in the towel might be a more plausible situation, no matter how disappointing that may be.
Maybe they migrated away from XP and have assurance that Bitlocker is safe for them or switched to something entirely different and have no interest or funding for development it anymore...
The Bitlocker recommendation does seem strange. But when you look around the Windows ecosystem, there isn't much else that could be recommended. What would you recommend Windows people use, other than Bitlocker?
2. Warrant canary makes no sense. There is nothing for a warrant to grab.
3. Forking is legally troublesome. Just because you can see the source doesn't mean you can distribute the source.
I had a look at the diff; I have neither the time nor crypto-specific skill to do an audit, but there are plenty of code changes that aren't warnings in there.
>2. Warrant canary makes no sense. There is nothing for a warrant to grab.
No, but they could have theoretically been asked to introduce a backdoor from a Lavabit-style order.
>3. Forking is legally troublesome. Just because you can see the source doesn't mean you can distribute the source.
Do you think that will stop people? Even if there is some legal issue, the Streisand Effect always overcomes it. So what if a TrueCrypt fork can't use Github because of that issue? Is the world suddenly lacking good hosting providers, perhaps in Switzerland or similar? Has everyone forgotten how to set up a public git repo themselves? Somehow, I think not. So what if many devs will probably have to contribute anonymously? With a product such as TrueCrypt, they probably should anyway.
This makes no sense. Lavabit was compelled to turn over evidence it told the government it had, which is straightforward law. There is nothing "Lavabit-style" about "distribute a back door or else." You would need explicit legislation to allow that. If the developer's cat was kidnapped to force him to put in a backdoor, there is nothing "Lavabit-style" about that.
You do hedge with the word "theoretically," but "theoretically" this could be a message from the aliens.
Do you think that will stop people?
It will stop the smart people, and you need smart people to work on it. Otherwise you would only be allowed to distribute it by illicit means, and you could never trust it. It would be as trustworthy as warez sites. Why even bother with that nonsense?
Much saner to just build something new, having learned from TrueCrypt's experiences. For example, something that starts from the command-line and then has a GUI in top, instead of the reverse.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)
No legislastion authorizes that program, among many others. I think what the parent was referring to as "Lavabit-style" was the "compromise your users or face legal action" move. Turning over customer data or introducing a backdoor are both means to the same end, as far as the NSA is concerned.
The NSA inserting backdoors into the product without the cooperation or maybe even knowledge of the vendor -- while troubling for any number of reasons -- is vastly different. Especially when giving advice to developers about how to stay in bounds with the law. If the metagame becomes "the government can legally force you to insert backdoors into your product" any developer faced with this threat might believe it, when he should know it's bunk.
[1] RSA allegedly got paid $10 million to make a change the NSA wanted. RSA customers should demand an answer, but that's not forcing the RSA. People get paid to do things all the time.
>Hushmail stated that the Java version is also vulnerable, in that they may be compelled to deliver a compromised java applet to a user.
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hushmail#Compromises_to_email_p...
>Hushmail turned over cleartext copies of private email messages associated with several addresses at the request of law enforcement agencies under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States.; e.g. in the case of U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo.
>if a court order has been issued by the Supreme Court of British Columbia compelling us to reveal the content of your encrypted email, the "attacker" could be Hush Communications, the actual service provider.
the company that provides Hushmail, states that it will not release any user data without a court order from the Supreme Court of British Columbia,
This is malarkey. Someone in the US could say "I'll fight all the way to the Supreme Court!!!" but you would be a fool to trust your business to their determination. Especially if they say it about a subpoena, which means they haven't even retained a lawyer to ask about this. (If your business plan depends on being able to wage a legal battle, you really shouldn't be scrambling through the yellow pages for a lawyer when you get your first subpoena.)
Back to the topic, I'll have to point out that this still isn't evidence of a company being required to backdoor a product. Hushmail, the same company that thinks it can fight a subpoena for third-party data all the way to the Supreme Court, said "well, we might be compelled to backdoor our product." This is just more repeating of the meme without evidence. It's unfortunate because some developer who remembers Hushmail might take their ill-informed legal opinion as reality.
Of course, Hushmail had access to cleartext copies of the messages. That's the killer. The government has the right to evidence about third parties in your possession. (Canada derives from British law tradition like the US. The government's right to all evidence is a concept that goes back centuries. If you can show that Canada broke from this tradition I would be most interested.)
No legislation forbids it either. If the NSA is legally able to search/seize a given piece of information why would you think they should not be allowed to forensically analyze it?
- XP is the only widely used version of Windows with no built-in FDE
- XP is finally, truly, EOL
So TrueCrypt no longer needs to exist.
(I'm not arguing that- that is what the message is saying)
It's not even like support means anything, other than that they will no longer improve or fix it, i.e., there's still time to migrate away as XP degrades. It says nothing about whether XP is secure in and of itself.
This whole incident is about as weird as weird gets.
I saw a post that suggested it might be a canary, i.e., an event that must be interpreted as a certain action having taken place...a negative message....an absence of an indication that everything is ok. But that also seems odd since I am not quite sure that if TrueCrypt people were who we all want to believe they were, would suggest using bitLocker. bitLocker??? Alone that suggestion smells like rotten fish just by its association with MS and the US government.
You should put money on the fact that it really was someone associated with certain ever increasingly fascist governments of, likely the USA or Israel, that compromised TrueCrypt in a way that set off an "auto-destruct" sequence. It's probably a reaction to the Snowden compromise, with increased funding and efforts to regain domination that he exposed by becoming even more totalitarian through an "Operation Kristallnacht" sprint against civilian institutions.