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Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ... by apl on Thursday May 22, 2014 @09:07AM (#7783597)
That's not the notion of consciousness we're dealing with when talking about the "hard" problem of consciousness. You're describing its psycho-functional interpretation: the ability to see yourself as a "self".

Qualia are a largely orthogonal issue. Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life.

Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ... by dragonwriter on Thursday May 22, 2014 @11:05AM (#7784191)
> Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life.

Yes, just as its possible that an entity we'd consider intelligent doesn't, but since it's subjective, its not subject to empirical -- and, hence, scientific -- verification. Anything we are going to say objectively on issues related to consciousness isn't going to address that, because that's a question outside the scope of science.

Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ... by KC8ZKF on Thursday May 22, 2014 @12:14PM (#7784560)
It's ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective, in the sense that we can ask questions and observe behavior. Pain is a good example.
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ... by Udo on Thursday May 22, 2014 @09:18AM (#7783643)
I agree it's a psycho-functional interpretation (I would call it duck typing), but my argument is that everything else looks like a pseudo-scientific attempt at philosophy to me. It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even viable in a mathematical context?
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ... by apl on Thursday May 22, 2014 @10:58AM (#7784168)

  > I would call it duck typing
Ha, that's a fairly apt comparison.

  > It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at
  > all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even
  > viable in a mathematical context?
That's not clear to me either, but there are some convincing arguments in favour of treating it at least logically if not quantitatively (like IIT does). I recommend the work of David Chalmers in this context because it's mathematically sound and written from the perspective of a dualist. Definitely worthwhile...