Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by apl on Thursday May 22, 2014 @09:07AM
(#7783597)
That's not the notion of consciousness we're dealing with when talking about the "hard" problem of consciousness. You're describing its psycho-functional interpretation: the ability to see yourself as a "self".
Qualia are a largely orthogonal issue. Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life.
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by dragonwriter on Thursday May 22, 2014 @11:05AM
(#7784191)
> Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life.
Yes, just as its possible that an entity we'd consider intelligent doesn't, but since it's subjective, its not subject to empirical -- and, hence, scientific -- verification. Anything we are going to say objectively on issues related to consciousness isn't going to address that, because that's a question outside the scope of science.
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by KC8ZKF on Thursday May 22, 2014 @12:14PM
(#7784560)
It's ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective, in the sense that we can ask questions and observe behavior. Pain is a good example.
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by Udo on Thursday May 22, 2014 @09:18AM
(#7783643)
I agree it's a psycho-functional interpretation (I would call it duck typing), but my argument is that everything else looks like a pseudo-scientific attempt at philosophy to me. It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even viable in a mathematical context?
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by apl on Thursday May 22, 2014 @10:58AM
(#7784168)
> I would call it duck typing
Ha, that's a fairly apt comparison. > It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at
> all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even
> viable in a mathematical context?
That's not clear to me either, but there are some convincing arguments in favour of treating it at least logically if not quantitatively (like IIT does). I recommend the work of David Chalmers in this context because it's mathematically sound and written from the perspective of a dualist. Definitely worthwhile...
Re:Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The ...
by rictic on Thursday May 22, 2014 @12:25PM
(#7784635)
There's many more points on the gradient, some of which are of practical importance. A person in deep sleep is less conscious than someone in light sleep who is less conscious than someone blearily waking up who is less conscious than that person when they're wide awake. More practically speaking it is medically and ethically important for a person under anesthesia to have low consciousness.
The cat and the toddler are clearly conscious in the sense that they do have a recognizable life experience. They don't just react to the environment, they make models of it, and they have a limited ability to abstract observations. They experience life, and they have complex dreams and emotions. However, they still lack a deeper understanding of causalities, and they can grasp the subjective realities of other beings only on an instinctive level. Adult humans are less limited in this regard, but it's easy to imagine hypothetical beings who perform better still.
That's bad news for the validity of consciousness as a concept, since it seems to be interlinked with intelligence, which itself is a fuzzy idea at best.
So these observations amount to the position that "consciousness" isn't a fundamental property at all, it's the result of other processes and it can come in different flavors. Likewise, the concept of "intelligence" is similarly flawed. In both, we tend to make the mistake of looking at them as simple scalar values. They're not. They're a name we give for a collection of different capabilities. As such, I believe a mathematical model of consciousness is actually pretty unscientific, since consciousness is not an objective property. It's an artificial label we're obsessed with.