Edit:
They are already up!
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.c...
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.g...
http://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.cryptography.moderncrypto.m...
The last two error out because they have not yet received any mailings since the registration on gmane.
I wonder if a higher security margin curve is really required here, though. (Block) ciphers usually have to worry about multi-target attacks; 128-bit security starts to feel small in that scenario. But curves don't have that problem: you need to actually do 2^128 computation even in the multi-target case, so it seems less necessary to insist on >256-bit curves. What's the rationale behind the higher security margin curves?
The rationale for an "extra-strength" curve is the hope it might resist future cryptanalytic breakthroughs. The extra bits aren't needed for brute force, but if some cryptanalysis comes along in 20 years and lops a bunch of "security bits" off, you might be glad you had extra ones...
That's a hard thing to quantify, but if we can get, say, 96 extra security bits for only a ~3.5x slowdown over Curve25519, it seems worthwhile.
[1] https://docs.google.com/a/trevp.net/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aie...
I completely get where you're coming from on the "one ciphersuite to rule them all" problem but as an early adopter I would happily use curve25519 as a stopgap until you decide what the One True Curve should be. Instead I have to do my own CurveCP implementation now and then maybe rip it out later.
But yeah, those might be 3 good candidates for a higher-security curve (Curve41417, Goldilocks, E-521).
In addition to DJB's Curve41417 (not yet implemented), Mike Hamburg's Goldilocks-448 curve looks pretty good, so I'm waiting for that to shake out.
http://sourceforge.net/p/ed448goldilocks/wiki/Home/
The "curves" mailing list will (hopefully) be a good place to track that discussion:
https://moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2014/000139.htm...