trevp
(C) is the observation that you could lie and claim someone else's fingerprint (print it on your business card, for example). This doesn't accomplish much, but is a general issue with fingerprints (e.g. OTR, SSH).
You can try to bind more of the context (e.g. hash more identifying information into the session key or MAC), but this makes things rigid, particularly if parties might be contacted under aliases (e.g., imagine if SSH servers needed to be configured with all possible DNS names they might be contacted under, and rejected others).
But even then, you can't 100% prevent this - if the protocol "binds" the phone number, you can lie and claim someone else's phone number, or name, etc.
The rationale for an "extra-strength" curve is the hope it might resist future cryptanalytic breakthroughs. The extra bits aren't needed for brute force, but if some cryptanalysis comes along in 20 years and lops a bunch of "security bits" off, you might be glad you had extra ones...
That's a hard thing to quantify, but if we can get, say, 96 extra security bits for only a ~3.5x slowdown over Curve25519, it seems worthwhile.
[1] https://docs.google.com/a/trevp.net/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aie...
But yeah, those might be 3 good candidates for a higher-security curve (Curve41417, Goldilocks, E-521).
In addition to DJB's Curve41417 (not yet implemented), Mike Hamburg's Goldilocks-448 curve looks pretty good, so I'm waiting for that to shake out.
http://sourceforge.net/p/ed448goldilocks/wiki/Home/
The "curves" mailing list will (hopefully) be a good place to track that discussion:
https://moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2014/000139.htm...
If you want resistance to traffic analysis check out Pond, which is also using this ratchet:
The "pin activation" algorithm is intended to make it difficult for a MITM to foist bad pins on clients, and to limit the lifetime of such pins.
https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/tack
Regarding certificate pinning: TACK is a different "style" of pinning, it lets you pin to a self-managed signing key instead of certificate keys. So it gives you more control and security than CA pinning, if you're willing to assume more key management responsibilities (storing a TACK private key, and using it to sign new TLS keys).
I think there's room for both approaches: I'd like to see CA pinning be made easy enough that most sites could deploy a fairly safe, simple pin to popular CAs, while high-security sites make use of TACK pins.
But we'll see how things go.
It will hopefully appear in OpenSSL 1.0.2. We'll be submitting Apache patches for it shortly. Daniel Jackoway (in this thread somewhere) is working on the NSS (client-side) corollary.