> The recipient of a Noise box can authenticate the sender, but cannot produce digitally-signed evidence binding the sender to anything.
This seems contradictory -- how can a recipient prove that the expected sender was the one who sent the box, without having binding evidence?
Given that the recipient knows that they did not forge the signature, they can infer that the signature is legitimate.
Given that a third party, to whom we fear the recipient might reveal the message, cannot know that the recipient did not forge the signature, they cannot infer that the signature is legitimate.
It's possible that i have misunderstood the OTR protocol, or Mr Perrin's claim about Noise boxes. As a result, please do not infer that the above explanation is definitely correct!
That's a characteristic of good cryptosystems.
The wiki itself is highly recommendable; I learned a lot just by reading about how his design works. This is what "modern" (post-2009?) crypto looks like.