News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Noise: Box and pipe cryptographic core by twic on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @04:00PM (#7746002)
The way this is done in the OTR protocol and friends is that the information is signed, and the recipient is given enough information to verify the signature, but also to forge the signature.

Given that the recipient knows that they did not forge the signature, they can infer that the signature is legitimate.

Given that a third party, to whom we fear the recipient might reveal the message, cannot know that the recipient did not forge the signature, they cannot infer that the signature is legitimate.

It's possible that i have misunderstood the OTR protocol, or Mr Perrin's claim about Noise boxes. As a result, please do not infer that the above explanation is definitely correct!

Re:Noise: Box and pipe cryptographic core by makomk on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @04:17PM (#7746102)
This appears to be essentially how Noise works too. The sender creates a shared MAC key using ECDH in a way that allows the receiver to obtain it and confirm it came from the genuine sender (assuming the proposed protocol works as intended). That shared MAC key is then used to authenticate the ciphertext. Since only the sender and receipient can obtain that key, the receipient can verify the message is signed so long as they know their private key isn't compromised, but they can't prove it to anyone else because they have all the information needed to fake a valid message of their choice.
Re:Noise: Box and pipe cryptographic core by timmclean on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @04:05PM (#7746025)
Thanks, this makes sense.