The issue isn't users recognizing path, it's the domain. It's also that they aren't taking special care while logging in.
Additionally, what about addressing insecure forms that fail to utilize https. Chrome is already detects login forms. So just warn users by turning the origin chip to a red background when they are on a login page.
On the whole, supporting secure logins would be better for the internet.
The team may choose to do something like that in the end. That's really the point of experimenting with different approaches; they use them to get feedback, run user studies, and get a sense of what works best.
> Additionally, what about addressing insecure forms that fail to utilize https. Chrome is already detects login forms. So just warn users by turning the origin chip to a red background when they are on a login page.
That's actually very, very hard (as in np-hard). Chrome has heuristics for detecting login pages, but it doesn't even detect all legitimate login pages. And it's trivial for a phisher to intentionally make a page that appears exactly like a login page to the user, but will not be detected by Chrome's heuristics.
Well, it wouldn't have to detect all login pages, it could just detect most of them. That would add soft pressure to encourage regular websites to use HTTPS in the vein of
https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere
Hopefully we can push the web towards https everywhere, and users begin to ask the question -- "Why is this page not secure" when performing a login.
This soft pressure worked wonders in a number of places: When Google started doing sitelinks, many websites became much more concerned about making those available on their website. In a similar way, hopefully they would be concerned with getting out of the red for their login pages.
It's not as simple as peolpe think of it. It never is.
FWIW, Firefox detects insecure login forms and emits a security warning to the web console. This is aimed at developers, however, not users (because the developers are the only ones who can improve the situation).
Our heuristic is imperfect as well. We simply detect <input type="password"> fields on http pages. This works well enough. Trying to detect when developers are abusing <input type="text"> for a password field is non-trivial.
There's also mixed content blocking³ which is a similar but user facing feature.
1: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=762593
2: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=327032
3: https://blog.mozilla.org/tanvi/2013/04/10/mixed-content-bloc...
On security, I feel its a problem sure, but teaching users about URLs is a bandaid fix, a hack and completely irrelevant to this change. You can't fix the phishing problem by showing URLs. It needs to be tackled in the proper manner and solved silently from the user.
Google already does the right thing when you use them for DNS (redirects on mispelt). They also implemented blacklists of dodgy content, not ideal and doesn't scale but its a good start. Better than claiming the user is at fault.
Basically if you need to claim the user is at fault your design is wrong whether you like it or not.
google://keyword
or better
google keyword
or even simply
keyword
e.g. google.com/search?q=http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fdemo3.html
I don't even know how he generates those URLs and he didn't respond when I asked why he does it.
although, I'll note that once again, the internet is already on the case. The link you were looking for was http://lmgtfy.com/?q=keyword
Most people have little idea what an URL is, nor how to use an address bar.
Watch a few people navigating to http://www.example.com/example.html to see what they do.
I personally have never understood the huge sums of money paid by some people for some URLs. I can't remember URLs; I can't remember keywords. What I can remember is some fragment of a page title, and I hope that's enough to find it in my bookmarks or in a websearch.
I wish Google would just release some numbers about the numbers of people who get this stuff wrong, because learning how many people use (correctly) the + operator made that change much easier to cope with.
Is that ever a good thing to say?
The change is good. I never saw any mention of people disliking this in Mobile Safari, and it's an option power users will turn off. There's plenty of them already.
There is nothing more that can be productively argued about this topic. There will be analogies about how complexity is hidden in various domains (cars, computers) and how beneficial it has been and how users are happy with it. Those arguments are fine and maybe they are being made in good faith, but it doesn't change the underlying future truth:
Marketing will now be changed to reflect Google keywords, not URLs. "www." and ".com" will become meaningless. Google will have put one more level of distance between what the users type in the URL and even what they click in the browser and what is reflected in the address bar.