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Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by leccine on Monday April 21, 2014 @08:04PM (#7624855)
OpenSSL is beyond repair. We need a new clean start, sane design and rock solid implementation with principles and following best practices.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by jerf on Monday April 21, 2014 @09:10PM (#7625135)
"We need a new clean start, sane design and rock solid implementation with principles and following best practices."

We need everything after the comma, sure, but there's no particular logical connection with the bit before your comma. A drop-in, API-compatible replacement (or at least one where the bits of the API thrown out are carefully chosen and generally unused) with OpenSSL that isn't scary and has been vetted is by far the fastest way to get to the second bit. This is probably the best thing that could have happened to OpenSSL, and I predict a decent chance this will be the dominant branch in under a year.

Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by Spittie on Monday April 21, 2014 @08:09PM (#7624877)
While I can agree with that, how do you get people to use your new awesome crypto library? LibreSSL (the name of the OpenBSD fork, it seems) API should stay OpenSSL-compatible, making it mostly a drop-in replacement.

Also, I think that an OpenSSL cleanup is needed even if we get a new awesome library too. We can't drop OpenSSL overnight, and as you said it's bad. So this at least make it less bad, until there's something we can switch to.

Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by leccine on Monday April 21, 2014 @11:05PM (#7625536)
Nobody said we can drop OpenSSL over night. If you start now in 2 years we might see the results.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by Steltek on Monday April 21, 2014 @11:16PM (#7625575)
A clean start should include a better license. Either accept that SSL libraries _absolutely_must_ be update-able and auditable to be sure, which for myself implies nothing less than LGPLv3; or go for second-best and have just a plain old no-advert BSD license that is suitable to the GPL-has-cooties privatized crowd.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by djmdjm on Monday April 21, 2014 @09:51PM (#7625302)
So far, two of the clean starts (Apple's and GnuTLS) are known for the critical "goto fail" bugs. How would your clean start be different?
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by leccine on Monday April 21, 2014 @11:03PM (#7625529)
I think if you dont understand what clean start means, there is no point having a conversation about this ^.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by AceJohnny2 on Monday April 21, 2014 @08:09PM (#7624875)
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by tptacek on Monday April 21, 2014 @08:21PM (#7624929)
NaCl addresses a different problem than OpenSSL. NaCl is great if you have no legacy or compatibility requirements, and it should be the only crypto library most web and mobile developers ever come within a mile of. But it's not a workable replacement for OpenSSL.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by Tomte on Tuesday April 22, 2014 @01:23AM (#7625970)
What about this from the libsodium web site?

"NaCl ships with constructions that were just prototypes, and that shouldn’t be used any more."

What does "shouldn't be used any more" mean? Certainly not security, or djb would have released an update. Compatibility with other products? Something else?

Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by tptacek on Tuesday April 22, 2014 @08:15AM (#7627158)
No, IIRC Bernstein improved his public key signing system, and libsodium uses the new version. Neither construction is useful for standard TLS.
Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by uuid_to_string on Monday April 21, 2014 @09:38PM (#7625251)
For per packet encryption.

For authentication, there is CurveCP.

People seem confident with OpenSSH's authentication mechanism. Why not use that?

At some point one has to trust that the IP address one is sending/retrieving data to/from is the correct one. That's easier said than done if some host wants to keep changing its IP address every few days.

The SSL PKI scheme (the SSL approach to authentication), as implemented for public websites, is not much of a confidence-builder, IMO. Opinions may differ.

If websites maintained consistent IP addresses and we could authenticate these machines using OpenSSH keys, I would be more willing to believe we could verify their "authenticity".

Re:OpenBSD forks, prunes, fixes OpenSSL by leccine on Tuesday April 22, 2014 @10:59AM (#7628026)
Exactly. The problem with SSL/TLS that it relies on a broken promise with the CAs, and as we have seen several times it is extremely easy to exploit. Hello rogue CAs.