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Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by mcpherrinm on Friday April 18, 2014 @04:03PM (#7611004)
Userland PRNGs are one of the easiest ways to introduce security vulnerabilities into your programs. I would recommend being very, VERY careful before trying to do this, like the traditional "Don't roll your own crypto" advice.
Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by ekimekim on Friday April 18, 2014 @05:47PM (#7611513)
Only in this case you aren't rolling your own crypto, but (hopefully) using a popular, field-tested CSPRNG available as a library for your language of choice. Unless you mistakenly pick a non-cryptographic PRNG, and assuming the implementation is correct (which is just as true of kernel code as it is of user code), I fail to see how you would introduce a vulnerability.
Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by raverbashing on Friday April 18, 2014 @04:13PM (#7611057)
Of course. But there are a lot of needs for random numbers that don't need the random numbers to be secure.
Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by dlitz on Saturday April 19, 2014 @06:36PM (#7614993)
Most developers don't know how to make that distinction, and even savvy ones know better than to take the risk of being wrong.

It's 2014. There are well-funded governments and organized crime attacking our systems. If downstream developers still have to ask the question, "what kind of random numbers does this API provide?", then it's a bug in the platform.

Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by azinman2 on Friday April 18, 2014 @05:10PM (#7611341)
In which case rand and the like really should be renamed unsecure_random to prevent confusion.
Re:Linux /dev/urandom and concurrency by raverbashing on Friday April 18, 2014 @06:51PM (#7611743)
Fine by me