The naive extrapolated "post-money valuation" number is still significant under many scenarios, and perhaps even the 'modal' (most-likely) or median scenario envisioned by the business insiders who are selling the shares.
After all, it's the exact price that, assuming a 1X liquidation preference, the venture would have to appreciate beyond for the VC to make any positive return – which is after all the whole point. It's the exit value at which the insiders take exactly the negotiated dilution, not extra dilution to protect the investors. (If the insiders' own reserve value was less, they'd likely be selling larger stakes, or the whole company.)
Generally, also, minority stakes like this have a discount to the full-company value because they're at the mercy of the majority/control stakes. (Though, preferences affecting governance also affect this.)
At such a large valuation, and such a small (5%) stake, I wonder what preferences were really offered. It looks like a raise from strength, like Facebook's pre-IPO raises – another time when armchair skeptics scoffed at the implied valuations (which in hindsight were bargains). Maybe the preferences aren't that big in such a case.
You'd be crazy to pay more than a few cents more than the market price for 1 share of AAPL, because that price represents the value the most marginal AAPL investor places on the stock: Offer him a penny more and he'll sell it to you. But there are investors standing behind him who think AAPL is worth more than the current price. As you need to buy out less marginal investors, the price to get them to hand over their AAPL shares will rise. Thus 1,000,000 shares will cost you more on average than one regardless of the value of control.
The same works in reverse with AirBNB: If they sell one share, it will go to the most enthusiastic investor who thinks they're a future $1T company. If they try to sell 1,000,000, they have to work their way down into those investors who believe AirBNB is a more marginal opportunity, and the average price will decline.
It would be interesting to probe into further, but the most directly applicable data is probably fairly hard to get ahold of, given that it's investment/acquisition offers not taken in lieu of the other.
In one case of selling shares you are inflating supply and thus dropping price, and when you are buying shares you are inflating demand thus raising the price.
Supply vs Demand is tricky....
Speaking of Twitter last night:
https://storify.com/ramcha/danielle-s-truthstorm-tips-on-sta...
It does illustrate how these don't mean anyone actually has $10 billion cash[1], but that wasn't the point here.
[1]: which does still confuse many as shown and explained here: http://money.stackexchange.com/questions/11368/how-are-start...
The difference between the private and public equity markets is scarcity of stock. Liquid dollars from wealthy investors chasing a small supply of transferable stock plumps valuations. Large rounds mitigate the risk that the company is selecting obscene price points.
> a VC's perspective towards share valuation is different than that of a "value investor"; a VC looks at the shares as if they were options
Value investors don't invest in IPOs - growth investors do. IPOs are marketed and bought on the basis of their asymmetric upside potential. VCs have no exclusive claim to optionality (originally a PE term).
> these aren't common shares; they're shares with privileges attached to them
VC preferred shares generally convert to common upon IPO. Valuations which make sense for privileged shares must thus make sense for the common past the IPO.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/technology/25facebook.html...
It is obviously possible for Andreeson to simultaneously be chief among "bubble deniers" and also correct about private company valuations.
You'll have to actually address the points themselves, sorry.
This is definitely ad-hominem, yourself.
> It is obviously possible for Andreeson to simultaneously be chief among "bubble deniers" and also correct about private company valuations.
Whatever, dude. Marc's point may be relevant for small slices of small firms, but no one has ever spent $500M on what are effectively equity call options outside of a bubble. As such, I posit in the case of AirBnB his logic is not applicable. So he's only just a bubble denier and not correct about private company valuations.
No one has ever seen a black swan outside of their dreams. If you see a black swan, you must be dreaming.
That means there's a chance of personal bias in his opinions, not that he's automatically wrong.
The valuation number is misleading. You're looking at the snapshot price of a relative small fraction of Airbnb's equity at a particular moment in time; just as 1,000,000 shares of XYZ will likely trade at a lower price than 1 share, so too might the valuation be lower for the whole company.
More importantly, these aren't common shares; they're shares with privileges attached to them, and thus command a higher value.
Finally, VC's perspective towards share valuation is different than that of a "value investor"; a VC looks at the shares as if they were options, with a limited (1x investment) downside but an uncapped upside.
These aren't my insights; they're taken from a bulleted list Andreesen twerped last night. They sound convincing to me.