Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su...
by abus on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:44PM
(#7604677)
That is the code that was removed. It was removed entirely. No error handling was added to replace it. I would hope it will error or pause elsewhere if there is not enough random data though.
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Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su...
by tptacek on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:46PM
(#7604682)
That's bad. The condition should remain, but the RAND_ call should be replaced with an abort(). I doubt crappy randomness is much of an issue for RSA blinding, but it's a dealbreaker for other crypto operations.
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su...
by X-Istence on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:51PM
(#7604718)
RAND_status() can never return 0 in the new OpenBSD code. All of the OpenSSL PRNG has been removed, and arc4random_buf() is used instead.
This means that this particular piece of code could NEVER be hit because there is never a time that RAND_status() is going to return 0! i.e. This is unreachable code.
On top of that RAND_add() is a no-op that won't do anything, since there is no way to add "seed" to the PRNG ...
See this commit: http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/58777eed1cff7c5b34cbc0262...