The justification given in the patch is that the private key might be given to a pluggable random number generator, which may presumably be controlled by an attacker or otherwise leak the key somehow. In that case, this bit of code is the least of your problems, since every other entropy is also being equally leaked.
This means that this particular piece of code could NEVER be hit because there is never a time that RAND_status() is going to return 0! i.e. This is unreachable code.
On top of that RAND_add() is a no-op that won't do anything, since there is no way to add "seed" to the PRNG ...
See this commit: http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/58777eed1cff7c5b34cbc0262...
Edit: apparently my brain went offline at a critical sentence. Consider this reinforcement of that point.
The line occurs during the setup for RSA blinding, which is the only point in the core RSA code (outside keygen) that requires randomness --- blinding mixes a random integer into the otherwise deterministic RSA operation, to foil timing analysis. The code should probably abort when that condition happens. I think, at first glance, that the condition never really happens on normal systems.