News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by tptacek on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:17PM (#7604506)
I'm sure this is a good patch, but before you freak out, here's the line he's probably referring to:

        if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
                {
                /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret
                 * exponent as unpredictable seed */
                RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
                }
This line is equivalent to "if you are already totally and royally fucked, do something cosmetic to pretend otherwise".

The line occurs during the setup for RSA blinding, which is the only point in the core RSA code (outside keygen) that requires randomness --- blinding mixes a random integer into the otherwise deterministic RSA operation, to foil timing analysis. The code should probably abort when that condition happens. I think, at first glance, that the condition never really happens on normal systems.

Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by kzrdude on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:36PM (#7604627)
Right, so what do crypto coding standards say about leaving weaknesses around as hard-to-hit special cases?
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by pbsd on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:42PM (#7604663)
It's not a weakness. If the condition triggers, nothing bad really happens.

The justification given in the patch is that the private key might be given to a pluggable random number generator, which may presumably be controlled by an attacker or otherwise leak the key somehow. In that case, this bit of code is the least of your problems, since every other entropy is also being equally leaked.

Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by abus on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:44PM (#7604677)
That is the code that was removed. It was removed entirely. No error handling was added to replace it. I would hope it will error or pause elsewhere if there is not enough random data though.
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by tptacek on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:46PM (#7604682)
That's bad. The condition should remain, but the RAND_ call should be replaced with an abort(). I doubt crappy randomness is much of an issue for RSA blinding, but it's a dealbreaker for other crypto operations.
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by X-Istence on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:51PM (#7604718)
RAND_status() can never return 0 in the new OpenBSD code. All of the OpenSSL PRNG has been removed, and arc4random_buf() is used instead.

This means that this particular piece of code could NEVER be hit because there is never a time that RAND_status() is going to return 0! i.e. This is unreachable code.

On top of that RAND_add() is a no-op that won't do anything, since there is no way to add "seed" to the PRNG ...

See this commit: http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/58777eed1cff7c5b34cbc0262...

Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by tptacek on Thursday April 17, 2014 @01:12PM (#7604868)
Yep, thanks. Makes sense.
Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by mikeash on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:25PM (#7604547)
That's slightly better, but shouldn't a crypto library return an error and refuse to continue when it encounters a "totally fucked" situation?

Edit: apparently my brain went offline at a critical sentence. Consider this reinforcement of that point.

Re:OpenSSL leaks RSA private key information into entropy su... by clarry on Thursday April 17, 2014 @12:28PM (#7604570)
I'm pretty sure that's what he meant by abort.