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Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by gvb on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @08:47PM (#7595301)
You could distrust any certificate that was signed before April 7 (or some slightly later date). It might be easier to do that and whitelist the good "pre-apocalypse" certificates. The nice thing about doing this is that your whitelist will inherently go to zero as certificates time out and get renewed (typically 1-3 years?).

The hard thing would be to generate an accurate whitelist.

Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by computer on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:41PM (#7595510)
Doesn't work, since rekeyed certificates are often (mostly?) backdated to have the same valid-from date as the old certificate.

I updated my key and certificate, and for the browser-visible certificate metadata only the fingerprint changed.

Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by jerf on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:49PM (#7595555)
For all that you've heard about the disaster side, there's also a huge number of sites that weren't affected. Whitelisting wouldn't help much.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by mygrant on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:01PM (#7595345)
We had certs that were only used and present on machines that were not vulnerable, and therefore did not replace or revoke them. Please don't do this.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by nathanvanfleet on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:36PM (#7595489)
Furthermore servers that weren't even using OpenSSL or the particular version(s) that were susceptible. What is the actual percentage of servers that needed to react to this?
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In... by 3pt14159 on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:40PM (#7595506)
I dunno... Probably worth it from a netsec point of view.