Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by nitrogen on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @08:39PM
(#7595259)
Would it be possible to use a probabilistic data structure (e.g. Bloom filter) to create a privacy-enabled CRL as a service?
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Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by daeken on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @08:46PM
(#7595293)
I don't see why not, especially because you already have the old key signature/fingerprint to use when pushing it into the Bloom filter. Seems like a perfect case for it, actually.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by gvb on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @08:47PM
(#7595301)
You could distrust any certificate that was signed before April 7 (or some slightly later date). It might be easier to do that and whitelist the good "pre-apocalypse" certificates. The nice thing about doing this is that your whitelist will inherently go to zero as certificates time out and get renewed (typically 1-3 years?).
The hard thing would be to generate an accurate whitelist.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by computer on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:41PM
(#7595510)
Doesn't work, since rekeyed certificates are often (mostly?) backdated to have the same valid-from date as the old certificate.
I updated my key and certificate, and for the browser-visible certificate metadata only the fingerprint changed.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by jerf on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:49PM
(#7595555)
For all that you've heard about the disaster side, there's also a huge number of sites that weren't affected. Whitelisting wouldn't help much.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by mygrant on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:01PM
(#7595345)
We had certs that were only used and present on machines that were not vulnerable, and therefore did not replace or revoke them. Please don't do this.
Re:Heartbleed is about to get worse, and it will slow the In...
by nathanvanfleet on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @09:36PM
(#7595489)
Furthermore servers that weren't even using OpenSSL or the particular version(s) that were susceptible. What is the actual percentage of servers that needed to react to this?