It wouldn't surprise me if plenty of people who would have previously reported a vulnerability to the government or local CERT are no longer willing to do so.
Once there is reason to believe that the benefits outweigh the costs, they will disclose it in a way that doesn't expose their knowing about it beforehand.
You seem to think "a government" is a unified entity. If the NSA (for example) discovered Heartbleed I'd expect you would be correct.
If someone in the IRS (for example) found it I'd expect they would behave very differently.
At which point (I imagine), decisions would be made along the same lines as I described, the key questions being "can we keep it secret?" and "who has this capability?".
I tried to be nation-agnostic, as I imagine there may be a bit of difference in how a given nations' intelligence agency weighs the value of their offensive capabilities and the public defensive capabilities in light of who knows about the bug.
A collection of rational actors may, as a whole, behave irrationally - as defined as 'against their own best interest'. Tragedy of the commons is but one example.
Organized systems may easily have structures that create irrational and destructive behavior, and those structures can be stable enough so that for each separate employee attempting to change the system would be risky, disadvantageous and irrational.
Citation needed. :)
There are two schemes that assure irrational governmental behavior -- dictatorship, and democracy. For different reasons, of course.
> Not really surprising but many people seem to assume the government will be either irrationally benevolent or irrationally evil.
There's plenty of historical support for those views -- you know, evidence?
High-ranking intelligence officials will push for more power, more capabilities, and will scrap things if they become risky.
If there's somebody sufficiently powerful whose career would be threatened from some risk of exploiting the bug, that risk will be taken seriously.
If there's somebody sufficiently powerful whose career would benefit from the government letting people know about that bug, it'll happen. This sounds unlikely, but this isn't my area of expertise and if somebody wants to correct me please do so.
Congress will largely ignore it because it has nothing to do with their constituency, they're mostly technically illiterate, and because they're being lied to anyways.
...and so on.
Daniel Kahneman says this has been proven false in his book Thinking Fast and Slow.
It think it is wrong on two levels. First individual's "perceived best interest" is often very far off of their real interest. Second, individual, and not only a few edge cases, are often not behaving in their best interest, even if we consider it to be their "perceived best interest".
Kahneman listed the three attributes of humans modelized as "econs" in the most common economic model: They are rational, selfish and their taste do not change over time. All three are obviously wrong.
In the theoretical sense, I agree with that, but in a world of social interconnections, we need a meaningful framework and vocabulary for judging these sorts of things. While I believe that true objectivity is hard (and maybe impossible), I think there's a lot of social value in coming up with widely accepted definitions of rational vs. irrational, at least on a case-by-case basis.
It has meaning. It means "we have insufficient information" or "something is going on here that we don't know about or understand."
In any case, that's a false dichotomy. Governments are not uniform entities, and there's no point talking about them as if they are. Governments, like people, do some rational and some irrational things.
Also, banks only deal with money, whereas in certain locations and situations, lives potentially depend on Gmail, Facebook and Twitter being secure. (oppressive governments and such)
However, even though spouting a conspiracy theory is a faux pas here, I can't help but wonder if the "he who smelt it, dealt it" rule applies here. Lets say your country were to setup a network interconnecting major research institutions, etc. After its use takes off and it is obvious that everyone is going to be communicating over this new medium in a short amount of time, you see the value in keeping tabs on people. You decide that it is in your best interest to put backdoors into encryption algorithms in enterprise communication software. So you see there are these guys that have become the place that everyone is starting to go to find what they are looking for. This is a good place to be. You eventually get your hands on this also. It's a waste of time and energy to constantly be decrypting everyone's messages, so what the hell- let's put a backdoor in that also. Everything is going well. Wait... ok, we should have thought of that. Another country now knows about this vulnerability and it hasn't been publicized, which means they will start using it to spy on contractors that work for us. We'd better leak this information so everyone fixes their hole. Let's tell Google. We're already on good terms with them.
But next, the feature went live on the servers of more or less everyone, including Google and Yahoo and Amazon. People who employ and, presumably, well-compensate many experts in security and SSL implementations. Still, the code marched on, unnoticed, undisabled, deployed. How did that happen?
This suggests that first the NSA discovered it, then Neel Mehta, and finally Codenomicon. As other commenters have rightly suggested, the government, or at least an agency there of, uses information asymmetry as a weapon of intelligence on its users (aka citizens). In the case of private corporations, they have a more contractual duty to their users to ensure that these bugs are patched so that those with malevolent intentions can't harm their users.
In my opinion, a bug that has been discovered but not shared is just as bad as a weaponized biological agent. Each rely on secrecy to exploit a group that is unaware.
I am not saying it's impossible the NSA knew. But people throwing around that article as evidence is absolutely laughable.
We probably need a stronger web security system people can be on. Also some of the blame falls to the big companies, banks, telcos etc themselves, I mean who wants to report security flaws to Telcos in a world where they then turn around and instead of giving you a $15k bounty, send you to jail like Weeve. And ok that's not the best comparison because he went well beyond discovering and did exploit as well. But none the less, some of the big corporate world need to clue in and get more friendly with tech rather than hostile, because right now they don't have a very good reputation and so then tech leaves them out in the cold. Did anyone think about notifying telcos and banks much? or just other big tech companies.