I did got to a Netflix talk once where they said that while moving from AWS would huge, they had a plan and I think from memory they said it would take about a week.
But the whole episode, and this post in particular, highlights the issue that enough review is never enough. When is the the code secure? When it is written by someone with a good track record? When it gets reviewed and committed by knowledgeable parties? When it's been running for several years without incident? When it passes coverity? When Willem has time to review it?
When I just think about the embedded ssh keys I've got in my few toy systems; if I discovered ssh was broken (and it's happened; look at the Debian bug) I'd be sinking a lot of time figuring out just how to change the keys everywhere. I should have designed for this from the start; lesson learnt. I bet there's lots of admins out there who wish they had better ways to update certs on a moments notice over the past week...
It strongly hints that even if this is 'only a POC' that their actual implementation is still vulnerable since their POC failed to protect against the very attack is was written to protect against.
But I am reasonably convinced that the CRT values are loaded into the normal heap, where they're available to a normal Heartbleed attack. Pinckaers doesn't have to be right about all his points to be right---just once---and I'm pretty sure he's right at least that once.
Still, I stand by my point of view that at the time of writing, akamai's POC was presented neither as an absolute final fix nor as their own production version of it, and judging it as such was misplaced.
That akamai realized the flaws he noted in their patch also applies to the real world code doesn't change that.
I never said the flaws he pointed were not real flaws nor unimportant ones, I merely disliked the ridiculous and unjustified tone he used to to destroy a proposal and used the same against him.
void *custom_malloc() { };
It's only a POC though so you'll have to adapt it. You can go ahead and begin praising me and flaming my critics.
Everyone involved in this, from the people who wrote the heartbeat code, the people who committed the code, the people at Akami who wrote this patch, this poster ... all would describe themselves as security engineers. Is everyone but Willem Pinckars incompetent?
I think the one lesson to learn is to treat crypto just like you do cloud providers. Make sure you have an exit strategy from day one; the ability to push a button to roll keys, switch algorithms, switch cert providers, etc.