Alice's Lemonade Stand charges $0.25 for a cup of lemonade,
gives out free refills, and will give you a new cup each time.
Bob's Lemonade Stand gives out free lemonade with free refills,
and gives you one free paper cup to start with,
but you must use the same cup each time.
Bob charges $0.25 to replace a lost, damaged, or dirty cup.
So basically people who go to Bob's Lemonade Stand are incentivized to continue drinking from the same cup even if it's dirty (its integrity is compromised.)Of course it's not a perfect analogy since certificates eventually expire, but you get the idea.
Their business strategy isn't a secret. If there were a vulnerability found in btrfs and a wave of people had their filesystems go belly up, I'd not expect Amazon to change the price of restorations.
There are many websites using StartSSL certificates that could also be using a compromised private key. Should there really be a lock icon in your browser if your connection is not actually secure?
I would much rather StartSSL provide free certificates, even knowing that not everyone whose private key was compromised regenerated a certificate, than have StartSSL pulled from trust stores and thus cause fewer future sites to not have SSL because of the associated cost.
Security is a lot more complicated than that little lock icon, anyway. Security means different things to different people, devices, and protocols. It's a UX/UI problem. What we need are fresh ideas on how to convey security concepts through GUIs and human interfaces. We need ways of visualizing privacy and trust networks (things like Lightbeam and Collusion), and ways of securely building trust links (things like interactively-verified Diffie-Hellman over NFC, or ssh-keygen's randomart)
Whether or not their users follow good security practices is not something they can account for. The only way they could account for it would be to force revocation of all previous certificates. The same is true of every other CA. It's incredibly likely that many users of SSL across the board will fail to replace and revoke old certs, regardless of what CA they use.
I agree that there are flaws in the way we currently utilize SSL. But that is a fully separate issue, and not related to "Should StartSSL specifically be considered untrusted". StartSSL shouldn't be singled out to have their business destroyed because the industry as a whole needs to be improved.
I don't know who's right here, but it's definitely not that simple.
What makes the CA-issued certificates trustworthy is that they are in fact verified to belong to the legitimate owner of the domain. Doing the verification and maintaining the CA’s infrastructure is not free so I don’t think it’s very surprising that the vendors charge for their service.
You should read about the history of Certstar, the Comodo RA. Why take money, expand ressources to verify the informations and issue the certificate when you can shortcut the verifications...
No matter how you look at it, the CA system is full of perverse incentives...
But then, StartSSL does not have a mandatory hidden cost. It just charges if you do something wrong.
The problem that everybody did something wrong and not by our fault is not exactly StartSSL's problem. I'd be impressed if they revoked the keys for free, but I don't see anything wrong on they not doing it.
Seems like a distinction without a difference to me.